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Abstract
The goal of this study is to have a better understanding of the dynamics of the International
Criminal Court, the challenges faced by this court in Africa, and the different assessments made
by scholars related to the Court. This study responds to these two research questions: What are
the challenges faced by the International Criminal Court specifically regarding Africa? Do the
challenges outweigh the advantages of this court? The study is a qualitative exploratory research
that is based on an inductive content analysis which explores the different perspectives on the
International Criminal Court.
The target population for this study is all 21st Century literature (research articles and reports,
government documents, and appropriate Internet resources) that address the 12 cases in Africa,
and which present the critics’assessments (i.e., oppose, support, and neutral) of the International
Criminal Court and its role in Africa. I use a data collection instrument and a filing system to
code and categorize the different materials to identify textual similarities.
The findings show three classes and seventeen categories. Indeed, the first class “Support” has
nine categories while the second class “Oppose” has five categories. The third and final class,
“Neutral” has three categories. This research reveals that most of the authors (eighteen) included
in my sample support the court while seventeen have a neutral attitude toward the International
Criminal Court. Also, fifteen authors do not support the court.
Keywords: international criminal court, deterrence, challenges, crimes against humanity,
genocide
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
Introduction
International relations have for centuries been punctuated and dominated by conflicts.
Crimes are being committed all over the world. These crimes constitute violations of human
rights. It is noteworthy that the emergence of modern civilizations has resulted in the focus on
the protection of human rights and human dignity. Lasting peace can only be achieved and
consolidated if the perpetrators of human rights violations such as genocide, crimes against
humanity, and torture can be held accountable to justice for their wrongdoing.
Problem Statement
Human rights are protected by international legal instruments. But these rights can be the
subject of violations through international crimes. International crimes may include genocide,
war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, and crime of aggression. These crimes that shock
the international community are punished by domestic or international tribunals. Indeed, States
have the right and the obligation to punish those responsible for crimes committed on their
territory, or if the criminal or the victim is one of their citizens. To do so, states must ratify
international legal instruments and transpose them into their domestic law.
Nevertheless, sometimes, governments do not punish those responsible for crimes against
humanity and genocide for various reasons. Indeed, in many countries especially in Africa,
individuals who have the responsibility to enforce the law put themselves and those who support
them above the law and use it unfairly against their opponents, which is abuse of power
(Tiemessen, 2016). Additionally, some states may not be able to enforce these crimes due to the
consequences of conflict such as the destruction of judicial infrastructures.
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The international community may intervene to protect human rights and punish people
who commit these crimes. In fact, more than sixty million people, in particular civilians died
during World War II (Browne-Marshall, 2011). The Nazis were responsible for the death of
Jews, and other minorities such as gypsies, homosexuals, and ethnic Slavs. Therefore, at the end
of World War II, the four principal allies, the United States, Great Britain, Soviet Union, and
France set up an International Military Tribunal in the German city of Nuremberg to punish
crimes committed by the Nazis (Joyner, 2005). This tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and crimes against peace (Joyner, 2005). The Nuremberg trial
lasted eleven months. The outcome of the trial was that many Nazis were convicted and
punished.
In 1946, Japanese defendants accused of war crimes during the World War II had been
tried by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, which was established by a Charter
issued by U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur. It is noteworthy that these tribunals remain an
important part of international criminal law. Indeed, they established limits to state sovereignty
and established the principle of individual responsibility (Browne-Marshall, 2011). Despite their
important part, some critics argued that these tribunals have been “victors justice” because the
victorious Allies were the judges, and the defendants were citizens of the countries that lost the
war (Scott, 2004). Some of these criticisms have made some people uneasy about tribunals after
conflicts.
The commission of war crimes committed during 1991-1993 in the former Yugoslavia
prompted the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to create an ad hoc tribunal, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (Scott, 2004). This tribunal
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was created through the Resolution 808 and could prosecute individuals for genocide, crimes
against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and violations of the laws and
customs of war. This tribunal was the first international tribunal since the Nuremberg and Tokyo
tribunals. Besides, the death of eight hundred thousand to one million Tutsis and “moderate”
Hutus in Rwanda during April-June 1994 led the United Nations Security Council again to
establish the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to prosecute perpetrators of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II through Resolution 955 of November 8, 1994.
It is noteworthy that the case law of these two tribunals, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
contribute to a better understanding of the definition of international crimes such as genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and sexual violence. Also, they shape the contours of
modes of liability, especially the joint-enterprise and command responsibility (Robinson &
Macneil, 2016). Despite their benefits, these two tribunals are not permanent courts and have
been created as a response to some conflicts. Therefore, their jurisdiction is limited to a territory
and a special time.
One of the primary objectives of the United Nations (UN) is to secure the universal
respect for human rights throughout the world. Also, the temporary nature of these international
criminal tribunals and the gravity of the international crimes led to the establishment of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) that is a permanent court. The International Criminal Court
was created by the Rome Statute on July 17, 1998. Its aim is to bring to justice individuals
responsible for “the most serious crimes of international concern” when states are unable or not
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willing to do so (Joyner, 2005, p.156). These serious crimes may include genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and crime of aggression. According to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (2021u), crime of aggression refers to “the planning, preparation,
initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct
the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity
and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations”. Acts of
aggression can include, among others, invasion, military occupation, and annexation using force,
blockade by the ports or coasts.
This court is an independent international organization, which does not belong to the
United Nations system. Its headquarters are in The Hague, the Netherlands. There are three ways
of bringing cases to the court: by a state party referral, by the court’s prosecutor (proprio motu)
or by the United Nations Security Council referral. Besides, it is noteworthy that the court may
have a positive impact on justice and peace (Gegout, 2013). Indeed, the court may have a
deterrent effect. The ICC’s jurisdiction increases the risk of prosecution for those who committed
crimes over which the court has jurisdiction, and this can deter some individuals from
committing crimes (Jo & Simmons, 2016). Also, its investigations and indictments also
encourage member states to improve their capacity to reduce, detect, and prosecute international
crimes (Jo & Simmons, 2016).
Despite these benefits, the International Criminal Court may face some problems that can
undermine its benefits. Some critics argue that the International Criminal Court is
instrumentalized at the international level and at the national level (Gegout, 2013; Tiemessen,
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2016) and it may face challenges of credibility. Others argue that the Court is a selective justice
regime focused on Africa (Ezennia, 2016).
That is why the topic for this study is the Examination of the role and challenges of the
International Criminal Court in the enforcement of law regarding crimes against humanity and
genocide in Africa.
Research Statements and Questions
International criminal tribunals are temporary, created following a specific conflict and
have limited jurisdiction with identified situation and time. On the contrary, the International
Criminal Court is permanent in time with global jurisdiction and a broader scope. As I said
above, the International Criminal Court is a court that despite its important contribution faces
some challenges.
Therefore, this study explores the following research questions:
• What are the challenges faced by the International Criminal Court specifically regarding
Africa?
• Do the challenges outweigh the advantages of this court?
My goal for this research is to review the creation of the International Criminal Court,
explore its benefits, and challenges in the enforcement of laws related to crimes against humanity
and genocide. This work is of great interest because it allows to have a better understanding of
the functioning of the International Criminal Court and to describe the major problems
encountered by this court in its mission.

Purpose of the Study
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A global decision made based on abstract notions of laws which are themselves based on
values and practices that differ from one country to another often cannot correctly predict
interpretations and application of those decisions. Though they were intended, this study assumes
that there may be challenges in the administration of the court that may have been overlooked.
Even if all aspects of this global court were considered in its conception, the interpretation and
application of those aspects may be understood or interpreted differently by participants from
different criminal justice systems, societies, or cultural contexts.
The creation of this court appears to replace various tribunals that have been established
over the years to look at human rights abuses and other crimes relating to different conflicts.
However, those tribunals have limited jurisdiction defined by particular conflicts and particular
social, cultural, economic and political contexts. As a standing court, both the structure and
administration of this court attempt to or anticipate a structural, operational, and sustained
characteristics that may or not apply equally well to all subjects and all situations.
Based on the above, this study is an attempt to understand and to explore specific
expectations and challenges of this court. This is not an evaluation but rather an exploratory
study focusing on the goals of the court, the challenges of administering it, observations of
scholars who have studied it and citizens of countries who benefited or not benefited from it and
others who have cared to offer insights.
The goal of this study is to have a better understanding of the dynamics of this court. It is
hoped that those who read the report of this study will best understand its mission and
challenges. It is hoped further that individuals in the position to improve the working of this
global institution might find this study helpful.
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Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
There are many and different efforts to discuss and to critique global efforts to provide
justice in situations that have appealed powerfully to conscience of people in many countries.
This is more evident when such events evoke outrage and even anger because or as a result of
crimes such as genocide and other forms of degradation and human suffering. Such global
sentiments result in collective efforts by regional governments and sometimes the United Nations
to address the observed problem by judicial efforts to hold culprits accountable and to find relief
or compensation for victims.
This review of literature examines current, historical, and intellectual responses or
analyses of such global efforts. Understandably some of the responses expose moral, political,
cultural, and sometimes religious sentiments. Some of the responses influence ongoing efforts
while some of them influence future national, regional or global reactions to ongoing or new
situations.
This review helps as I identify specific observations and critiques of the current focus, the
International Criminal Court. Moreover, this review focuses not only on published works or
research on past tribunals and international efforts to address human rights abuses by
government officials or individuals in power but also on the International Criminal Court cases
outside and inside Africa.
International Tribunals
International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg
According to Eubank (1973), after the World War I, Germany was blamed for the war
and destruction it brought. Indeed, under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles that concluded the
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World War I in 1919, Germany lost territories in Europe and its colonies. Also, Eubank (1973)
says that the German’s army was reduced to 100,000 men and officers and the navy was limited.
Marsico (2015) posits that in addition to the loss of territories, Germany was also ordered to pay
roughly $33 billion in reparation to other countries for the damage they had suffered. Moreover
in 1933, Adolf Hitler became the Chancellor of Germany. Langley (2017) declares that for
Hitler, the Jews betrayed Germany by pushing government leaders to sign the Treaty of
Versailles. Marsico (2015) observes that World War II was a global war that lasted from 1939 to
1945 and involved more than 60 countries and killed around 60 million people. This war
involved the Allies (France, United States, Great Britain, Soviet Union) and the Axis (Italy,
Germany, and Japan). Furthermore, Marsico (2015) states that Adolf Hitler, leader of the Nazi
Party violated the Treaty of Versailles by rearming Germany and signed the Tripartite Act with
Italy and Japan on September 27, 1940, to further his ambitions of world domination. According
to Langley (2017), World War II began in Europe on September 1, 1939, with the invasion of
Poland by Germany led by Hitler and subsequent declarations of war on Germany by the United
Kingdom and France on September 3rd. Also, the war between the Soviet Union and Germany
began on June 22, 1941, with the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Besides, Langley (2017)
says that the war in the Pacific began on December 7, 1941, when Japan attacked the American
naval base at Pearl Harbor and other American, Dutch, and British military installations
throughout Asia. Langley (2017) declares that the bombing killed 2,403 Americans and damaged
21 ships and 347 aircraft. This attack by Japan compelled the United States to enter the war.
Therefore, Langley (2017) states that on December 8, 1941, the United States declared war on
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Japan and four days later declared war on Germany, joining Great Britain, France, and the Soviet
Union to form the Allied forces.
According to Langley (2017), on August 6, 1945, the United States dropped atomic
bombs on Hiroshima and three days later Nagasaki. On May 7, 1945, Germany surrendered to
the Allies. Also, after the bombing of its two cities, Japan surrendered to the Allies on August
14, 1945, ending World War II. Equally important is the fact that Marsico (2015) states that
shortly after Adolf Hitler came to power as chancellor of Germany in 1933, he and his Nazi
government began implementing policies designed to persecute German-Jewish people and other
perceived enemies of the Nazi state. In fact, according to Destexhe (1995), Hitler and the Nazis
believe that the Jews were the source of all Germany’s ills. Hitler and his Nazi government
established concentration camps. These concentration camps were created in 1933 under the
Nazi regime to detain their enemies for forced labor.
But, Marsico (2015) says that later, these concentration camps became the site of the
mass killing of Jews. Indeed, as we said above Hitler blamed the Jews. In her book, Marsico
(2015) reports the statement of Hitler, “We shall regain our health only by eliminating the Jews”
(p.34). Therefore, according to Marsico (2015), Nazis imprisoned Jews, Roman Catholics,
people with disabilities, homosexuals, and those who do not share Nazi ideologies. Also, in
1942, Hitler ordered the killing of Jewish prisoners in these concentration camps, often using
poisonous gas. Marsico (2015) declares that the genocide of Jews is called the Holocaust.
Following World War II, on August 8, 1945, the four major Allied powers therefore
signed the 1945 London Agreement, which established the International Military Tribunal of
Nuremberg that was the first international criminal tribunal to prosecute war criminals.
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According to Weiss and Daws (2018), the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal
of Nuremberg called for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals of
the European Axis. Also, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg was
annexed to the 1945 London Agreement and outlined the tribunal’s constitution, functions, and
jurisdiction.
The tribunal was composed of judges from the United States, France, Great Britain, and
the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Weiss and Daws (2018) say that the Nuremberg Charter
provided that the Nuremberg tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate crimes against peace, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity. Also, according to Office of The Historian (n.d), the
tribunal was given the authority to find any individual guilty of the commission of the crimes
cited above and to declare any group or organization to be criminal. Moreover, the Nuremberg
Trial lasted from November 1945 to October 1946. Office of The Historian (n.d) declares that
the prosecutors indicted 24 Nazi leaders but 22 were tried because one of the accused committed
suicide while in custody and the other stood down due to illness.
It is noteworthy that Nazi leader Adolf Hitler was not indicted because he had committed
suicide in April 1945, in the final days before Germany’s surrender. According to The Avalon
Project (2008), the tribunal also indicted Nazi organizations, including The Leadership Corps of
the Nazi Party; The Gestapo; The S.D.; The S.S.; The S.A.; The Reich Cabinet, and The General
Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces. Furthermore, on October 1, 1946, the
tribunal announced its verdicts. Three of the 22 defendants were acquitted; nineteen were found
guilty. Also, History (2019a) declares that three were sentenced to life in prison, four to prison
terms from ten to 20 years, and 12 to death. In addition to these convictions, The Avalon Project
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(2008) states that the Nuremberg Tribunal also concluded that three of the seven indicted Nazi
organizations were “criminal organizations” under the terms of the Charter: the Leadership
Corps of the Nazi party; Gestapo and SD, and SS unit.
According to Schabas (2012), some critics said that the Nuremberg trial constituted
‘victors’ justice’. Indeed, the first issue related to the Nuremberg trial is related to the respect of
due process rights. Schabas (2012) argues that that there is a lingering sense that due process
rights generally recognized as minimum guarantees were not fully respected. The second issue
concerns the selectivity of the tribunal. In fact, only Nazi perpetrators have been tried even
though, there was much evidence that some of the crimes over which the tribunal had jurisdiction
had also been perpetrated by the Allied powers. For example, Schabas (2012) declares that “war
crimes and other atrocities perpetrated by the victors, ranging from the Katyn´ massacre to the
dreadful bombings of cities in Germany and Japan, including the nuclear destruction of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the more quotidian breaches of international law associated with
brutal armed combat such as murdering prisoners or the issuance of orders not to take them,
remained unpunished to this day” (p.74).
Despite these critics, I think that the Nuremberg tribunal represents an enormous
achievement in international law. It is the first international tribunal where those who violate
human rights and international law were held responsible for their crimes. Also, the tribunal of
Nuremberg is an important part of international criminal law because it establishes limits to state
sovereignty and government officials’ immunity. Indeed, Head of States and government
officials have long enjoyed a special status characterized by immunities.
However, this immunity for political leaders is no longer absolute. In fact, the immunity
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of Head of States at the international level is denied by the Charter of the tribunal of Nuremberg
through the article 7 when international crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
crimes against peace are committed. Therefore, political leaders are no longer protected by their
immunities and must therefore be responsible for their actions. As a result, anyone who has
committed acts constituting crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes against peace may
be held criminally responsible.
Moreover, the Charter of the Tribunal and the tribunal rulings recognize some principles
of international law that were later affirmed in a resolution by the United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 95(1) on December 11, 1946. For example, Principle II states that criminal
liability exists under international law even if domestic law does not punish an act which is an
international crime. Also, Principle III affirms the denial of immunity for individuals who acted
as Head of State or Government officials.
International Military for the Far East or Tokyo
Langley (2017) states that Japan had few natural resources such as oil and metal ores.
Therefore, according to Marsico (2015), it wanted to colonize countries that could provide these
resources. Moreover, Langley (2017) declares that in 1931, Japanese government officials not
only decided to invaded Manchuria in northeastern China, a region rich in iron and coal, but also
to sign the Tripartite Act with Germany and Italy on September 27, 1940. Also, Langley (2017)
observes that Japan seized the cities of Beijing and Shangai, starting the Second-Sino Japanese
War. According to Facing History and Ourselves (2018), in these two cities, Chinese civilians
and prisoners of war were killed in a savage campaign of rape, torture, and mass murder by
Japanese forces.
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Also, Facing History and Ourselves (2018) in an article says that similar acts were
committed by Japanese forces in other areas of China and during their wartime occupation of
Manila in the Philippines. Besides, Natarajan (2011) argues that Japan was accused by the Allied
leaders of murdering civilians torturing prisoners and utilizing the bubonic plague against
Chinese cities during World War II. It is noteworthy that according to Facing History and
Ourselves (2018), at their final wartime conference, held in July 1945 at Potsdam, Germany,
Allied leaders agreed on a policy for post-war Japan and stated their intention to hold the
Japanese responsible for war crimes, including inhuman treatment of Allied prisoners.
Moreover, Langley (2017) says that the United States stopped the trade with Japan to
punish it for its aggressive actions toward China. Therefore, according to Langley (2017),
Japanese government officials decided to bombed Pearl Harbor, a US naval base in Hawaii on
December 7, 1941. The next day, the US congress declared war on Japan on December 8, 1941.
Also, Langley (2017) asserts that Germany and Italy declared war on the United Stated on
December 11 to support Japan.
Langley (2017) posits that following the Potsdam conference by the Allies from July 17August 2, 1945, and the refusal of Japan to surrender on its terms, the United States dropped the
first atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima, on August 6, 1945, and Nagasaki, on
August 9. After the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan in August 1945, the
Emperor of Japan issued a statement of unconditional surrender. Besides, according to the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (United Nations, 1946), the Soviet
Union, the United Kingdom and the United States agreed to a basic structure for the occupation
of Japan and General MacArthur, as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, was granted
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authority to “implement the Term of Surrender which requires the meting out of stern justice to
war criminals…”. Therefore, Minear (1971) states that on January 19, 1946, acting pursuant to
this authority, General MacArthur issued a decree and established the Tokyo charter that called
for the “just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals in the Far East” (p. 21).
According to the Charter of the tribunal (United Nations, 1946), it had jurisdiction over
crimes against peace, conventional war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The Tokyo war
crimes trial took place from May 1946 to November 1948. In fact, Minear (1971) observes that
twenty-eight high-ranking political and military leaders were indicted. It is noteworthy that
according to Minear (1971), all defendants pleaded guilty except one defendant who had been
dismissed from the court to undergo psychiatric treatment. Furthermore, Minear (1971) asserts
that on November 4, 1948, the defendants had been found guilty. Also, Minear (1971) declares
that seven were sentenced to death by hanging, sixteen to life imprisonment, two to lesser terms,
two had died during the trials and one had been found insane.
As the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East is considered as unfair. According to Schabas (2012), during the Tadic trial, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia said: [t]he Nuremberg and Tokyo
trials have been characterized as ‘victor’s justice’ because only the vanquished were charged
with violations of international humanitarian law and the defendants were prosecuted and
punished for crimes expressly defined in an instrument adopted by the victors at the conclusion
of the war. Therefore, the International Tribunal is distinct from its closest precedents (p.76).
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Despite these critics, it should be noted that the Tribunal for the Far East has had a
profound impact on international criminal jurisprudence. Thanks to this tribunal, all individuals
can see their responsibility engaged before international tribunals.
International Military for the former Yugoslavia
According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (2021), the
former Yugoslavia was made up of six republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. According to Agence France Presse (AFP) (2017), following
the death of its leader Josip Broz Tito in 1980, the Yugoslav federation found itself in crisis with
bickering between ethnic groups and surging nationalist sentiments. Moreover, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (2021) said that in 1991, Slovenia and Croatia
blamed Serbia of unjustly dominating Yugoslavia’s government, military, and finances while
Serbia in turn accused the two republics of Slovenia and Croatia of separatism. Slovenia and
Croatia republics started advocating a greater decentralization of Yugoslavia's government.
Therefore, according to the Agence France Press (2017), on June 25, 1991, the parliaments of
Slovenia and Croatia declared independence. Besides, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (2021) observed that in March 1992, in a referendum boycotted by Bosnian
Serbs, more than 60 percent of Bosnian citizens voted for independence. But, in April 1992, war
broke out between Bosnia's Muslims and Croats, who were on one side, and Bosnian Serbs on
the other side.
Moreover, according to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(2021), led by Radovan Karadzic and armed by the JNA, the Serbs declared that territories under
their control are Serb republics in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Soon after, Bosnian Croats soon
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followed, rejecting the authority of the Bosnian government, and declaring their own republic
with the backing of Croatia. Equally important is the fact that Destexhe (1995) assumes that
every party involved in the conflict has committed war crimes, but the Serbs committed these
crimes on a far greater scale than the Bosnians or Croatians. It is noteworthy that BrowneMarshall (2011) declares that the conflict led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people
and the displacement of millions.
Besides, Agence France Press (2017) states that Bosnian Serb troops immediately started
a siege of the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo which would last 44 months. According to Agence
France Press (2017), in August 1992, the first images of skeletal prisoners in camps showed to
the world the campaign of ethnic cleansing by Serb forces. Furthermore, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia declared that on July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces
took over the UN-protected "safe area" of Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia and massacred up to
8,000 Muslim men and boys. Mojzes (2011) argues that the massacre was carried out under the
supreme command of General Mladic who was present when military and paramilitaries from
Republika Srpska and Serbia killed 8,000 Bosnians.
Moreover, the Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations (United Nations, 1945)
allows the Security Council to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression" and to make recommendations or to use non-military and military
action to maintain or restore international peace and security. Measures not involving the use of
armed force may include sanctions and the creation of international criminal tribunals. Therefore,
the United Nations Security Council created the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia based on chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in 1993.

24
Indeed, according to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 808 (United
Nations, 1993) of February 22, 1993, violations of international humanitarian law committed in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 were a threat to peace and international
security. Besides, Weiss and Daws (2018) argue that the tribunal’s goal was to try those
responsible for such violations and had jurisdiction to try grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions, violations of the laws and customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity
committed on the territory of former Yugoslavia since 1991. It is noteworthy that Mojzes (2011)
asserts that the tribunal has tried major political and military leaders such as Radislav Krstic,
Ratko Mladic, Slobodan Milosevic, and Tihomir Blaskic.
The tribunal faced some difficulties when it operated. Indeed, according to Mojzes
(2011), states influenced the work of the tribunal through their allies on the UN Security
Council. In fact, Mojzes (2011) posits that according to the tribunal’s former chief prosecutor
Carla Del Ponte, before the arrest of Mladic and Karadzic, Russian government officials
protected these two accused and threatened to cut off the tribunal’s funding if the prosecutor still
tries to indict them. Furthermore, states were not willing to cooperate. Therefore, Weiss and
Daws (2018) argue that to intensify states’ cooperation, the US has threatened to withhold
financial assistance to both Serbia and Croatia. It is noteworthy that after these threats, most
senior officials from Serbia and Croatia surrendered.
In addition to the lack of cooperation from states, Mojzes (2011) says that the tribunal
was accused of being partial. Indeed, according to Mojzes (2011), even though the former chief
prosecutor Carla Del Ponte received requests that she should investigate charges which NATO
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization) attacked civilian targets and committed war crimes against
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Serbia in 1999, she did not investigate NATO because it would be difficult to her to investigate
the local Balkan war crimes without NATO members’ cooperation.
Another failure of the tribunal is the fact that victims of international crimes could not
receive reparation. According to the statute of the tribunal, reparations must be sought before
national courts. Therefore, according to the tribunal, the Registrar of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia transmits to the competent authorities of the States concerned
the judgment by which the accused is found guilty of a crime which has caused damage to a
victim. The victim must then take legal action before the national court to obtain compensation.
Despite its flaws, I think that the trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia proved that nobody is above the law. Indeed, some high-level perpetrators
were tried and convicted by the ICTY such as Radislav Krstic and Tihomic Blaskic. Also, the
tribunal indicted and tried the former President of Yugoslavia and Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic.
Even though, he died before the end of the trial, his trial was significant because he was the first
Head of state to face charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, graves breaches of the
Geneva Conventions, and violations of the laws and customs of war for Kosovo, Croatia, and
Bosnia. Moreover, through its rulings, the tribunal established that genocide had taken place in
Srebrenica. Indeed, through the conviction of General Radislav Krstic and Bosnian Serb army
leaders Vujadin Popovic and Ljubisa Beara for genocide, the tribunal established that genocide
had been committed at Srebrenica. Also, the tribunal developed the contours of the definition of
crimes against humanity. Indeed, in the Tadic case, judges ruled that crimes against humanity
were not limited to an armed conflict. This decision reflects the contemporary legal and social
context.
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International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
According to History (2019b), Rwanda became a Belgium trusteeship under the League
of Nations mandate after World War I, along with neighboring Burundi. History (2019b) states
that Rwanda’s population was constituted of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. According to Destexhe
(1995), during Rwanda’s colonial period, Belgians favored the minority Tutsis over the Hutus,
this led to tensions between these two groups. Furthermore, Destexhe (1995) states that a Hutu
revolution in 1959 forced many Tutsis to flee the country and 20, 000 Tutsis have been killed.
History (2019b) argues that by early 1961, victorious Hutus had forced Rwanda’s Tutsi
monarch into exile and declared the country a republic. Even though, Belgium officially granted
independence to Rwanda in July 1962, ethnically violence continued in the years following
independence. Moreover, Destexhe (1995) declares that in 1973, Major General Juvenal
Habyarimana who was a moderate Hutu became the President of Rwanda and founded a new
political party, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (NRMD). Also,
Destexhe (1995) says that in addition to this party, a political party, the Coalition for the Defence
of the Republic (CDR) was also created. Furthermore, Destexhe (1995) states that with the
complicity of the army and government officials, those two political groups created militias (the
Interhamawe and Impuzamugambi) and manipulated the media to carry out the genocide
(Destexhe, 1995).
Moreover, History (2019b) declares that in 1990, when forces of the Rwandese Patriotic
Front (RPF), consisting mostly of Tutsi refugees, invaded Rwanda from Uganda, government
officials accused Tutsi residents of being RPF accomplices and arrested hundreds of them.
Therefore, Destexhe (1995) posits that between 1990 and 1993, government officials directed

27
massacres of the Tutsi such as the massacre of 300 Tutsis in the region of Bugesera. Besides,
Wilson (2011) states that despite the signature of the Arusha agreements in Tanzania by
Habyarimana on August 4, 1993, that called for the creation of a transition government that
would include the RPF, many Hutus believed that the President has betrayed them by signing
these agreements. Also, according to Destexhe (1995), on April 6, 1994, a plane carrying
Habyarimana and Burundi’s president Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down over the capital city of
Kigali.
Reid (2019) argues that within an hour of the plane crash, the Presidential Guard,
together with members of the Rwandan armed forces (FAR) and Hutu militia groups known as
the Interahamwe (“Those Who Attack Together”) and Impuzamugambi (“Those Who Have the
Same Goal”), set up roadblocks and barricades and began slaughtering Tutsis and moderate
Hutus with impunity. Furthermore, Destexhe (1995) states that the ethnic classification system of
identity cards introduced by the Belgians enabled the Hutu regime to carry out the genocide of
Tutsis. Also, according to Destexhe (1995), radio broadcasts especially Radio Mille Collines
played an important role in the genocide when Radio Mille Collines announced “By 5 May, the
country must be completely cleansed of Tutsis” (p.viii). According to Wilson (2011), about 10
percent of the total Rwandan population and 85 percent of the Tutsi population were murdered.
On 18 July 1994, the RPF entered Kigali and a new government took power.
According to Crowe (2014), for three months, from April 1994 to June 1994, 500,000800,000 Tutsi tribesmen and 50,000 Hutus were killed by Hutu genocidaires in Rwanda. So,
through Resolution 955 (1994) of November 8, 1994, the United Nations Security Council
(United Nations, 1994) ruled that acts of genocide and other serious violations of international
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humanitarian law committed in Rwanda were a threat to international peace and security.
Therefore, it created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to prosecute individuals
responsible for such acts or violations. Moreover, Weiss and Daws (2018) say that this tribunal
located in Arusha, Tanzania had the authority to prosecute and adjudicate charges of genocide,
crimes against humanity, and breaches of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
committed in the territory of Rwanda and in the territory of neighboring States between January
1, 1994, and December 31, 1994.
As the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Wilson (2011) says
that the ICTR failed in some points. Indeed, according to the statute of the tribunal for Rwanda,
victims can only participate in the proceedings as witnesses and must be sought reparation before
Rwanda courts. Besides, according to Wilson (2011), even though, the tribunal has tried Hutu
extremists for genocide, it did not try high-ranking RPF figures. Indeed, Wilson (2011) states
that a 1994 investigation authorized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
found evidence that RPF forces had killed “thirty thousand civilians in reprisals between May
and December 1994” (p.31). Also, Wilson (2011) observes that Amnesty International estimated
that between April and July 1994, RPF soldiers killed up to “sixty thousand Rwandan villagers”
(p.44).
Despite the critics and its failures, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda had an
important impact on the development and application of international criminal law. Indeed, the
tribunal’s rulings are an indisputable proof of the implementation of individual responsibility.
For example, the conviction of Mr. Jean Kambanda, head of government to life imprisonment
translated a strong and dissuasive message and a warning to political leaders. Furthermore,
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alongside this historic trial, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda issued another
judgment which set a precedent in the implementation of individual criminal responsibility. In
fact, Jean-Paul Akayesu case, the chamber concluded that rape was an integral part of the
process of destruction particularly directed against Tutsi women and having specifically
contributed to their annihilation.
In addition to these two trials, another trial in the Genocide Media Case has also left its
mark on international case law. By sentencing Ferdinand Nahimana, Hassan Ngeze and JeanBosco Barayagwiza to prison for incitement to genocide, the tribunal has sent an important
message regarding the use of the media as a weapon of mass destruction. Besides, this tribunal
encouraged the growth of domestic legislations and prosecutions.
International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals
According to Wilson (2011), the ad hoc tribunals were temporary tribunals that
prosecuted only the most senior-level military and political leaders. Therefore, cases involving
mid- and low-level perpetrators were transferred to domestic courts for prosecution. Besides,
Weiss and Daws (2018) argue that to accelerate the completion strategy of the two international
criminal tribunals, on December 22, 2010, the United Nations Security Council established a
residual mechanism common to both tribunals that has the jurisdiction, rights, obligations, and
essential functions of these two tribunals.
Furthermore, Weiss and Daws (2018) observe that the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda completed its mandate and closed on December 31, 2015, while the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia also completed its mandate and closed at the end of
2017. Moreover, Weiss and Daws (2018) say that related to the International Criminal Tribunal
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for the former Yugoslavia, 161 people were indicted, nineteen defendants were acquitted, and
thirty-two defendants were convicted while the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
indicted ninety-three people, sentenced sixty-one, and acquitted fourteen.
Moreover, according to the Statute of the Mechanism (International Residual Mechanism
for Criminal Tribunals, 2010), the mechanism is responsible for the search and prosecution of the
last fugitives; trials for contempt and false testimony; review trials; appeal procedures;
monitoring of cases referred to national courts; protection of victims and victims, witnesses;
supervision of the execution of sentences handed down by the International criminal tribunals;
assistance to national courts, and the conservation and management of archives. It is noteworthy
that according to Soufi and Maurice (2015), the mechanism has concurrent jurisdiction with
national courts for international crimes, but it has primacy of jurisdiction. It should be noted that
the mechanism follows the same operating mode as the ad hoc tribunals.
In conclusion, the literature review of some international tribunals that have jurisdiction
over crimes against humanity and genocide allows me to show that these tribunals have been
created for a specific conflict and for a period. These tribunals are not permanent tribunals. The
need for a permanent court led to the creation of the International Criminal Court in 1998. This
court has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and the crime of
aggression. There have thus far been 30 cases before the Court, with some cases having more
than one suspect.
ICC Cases
The second part of the review is based on a brief review of the International Criminal Court’s
cases outside and inside Africa.
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Georgia
According to Human Rights Watch (2016a), Georgia is a state party that ratified the
Rome Statute in 2003. The International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) (2018a) posits that
in January 2016, the Pre-Trial Chamber allowed the Prosecutor to open an investigation proprio
motu in the situation in Georgia. Besides, according to the International Criminal Court (2021k),
the alleged crimes committed in the context of an international armed conflict between July 1,
and October 10, 2008, in and around South Ossetia include crimes against humanity and war
crimes. The International Federation for Human Rights (2018a) asserts that these crimes have
been allegedly committed by the three main parties to the conflict, the Georgian armed forces,
the South Ossetian de facto forces, and the Russian armed forces. It is noteworthy that until
today, the Prosecutor still investigates the Georgia case and have not requested yet arrest
warrants for anyone.
Ukraine
Corder (2020) asserts that Ukraine is not a Statute Party to the Rome Statute but has
accepted its jurisdiction. Indeed, on April 17, 2014, the Government of Ukraine lodged a
declaration under article 12(3) of the Statute accepting the jurisdiction of the Court over alleged
crimes committed on its territory from November 21, 2013, to February 22, 2014. Therefore,
according to the ICC Preliminary Examinations 2020 Report (International Criminal Court,
2020), the preliminary examination of the situation in Ukraine was announced on April 25, 2014.
Also, Corder (2020) says that Ukraine extends the jurisdiction of the court to cover conflicts in
Crimea and eastern Ukraine. That is why the Office of the Prosecutor in his 2020 Preliminary
Examinations Report (International Criminal Court, 2020) says that the preliminary examination
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of the situation in Ukraine include alleged crimes occurring after February 20, 2014, in Crimea
and eastern Ukraine. According to Corder (2020), the preliminary examination is based on
allegations of crimes starting with the brutal crackdown on pro-European Union protests in
2013-14, the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the drawn-out conflict in eastern
Ukraine.
Reuters (2020a) posits that the Office of the Prosecutor completed its preliminary
examination of the situation in Ukraine in December 2020 and concluded that there was a
reasonable basis to believe that war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed.
According to Reuters (2020a), the prosecutor says that she would seek permission to open a
formal investigation into whether war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed
during the Ukraine conflict.
Palestine
According to the International Criminal Court (2021v), on January 1, 2015, the
Government of Palestine through a declaration accepted the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) over alleged crimes committed in the occupied Palestinian territory,
including East Jerusalem, since June 13, 2014. On January 2, 2015, the Government of Palestine
ratified the Rome Statute. Moreover, on January 16, 2015, the Prosecutor announced the opening
of a preliminary examination into the situation in Palestine to establish whether the criteria for
opening an investigation are met. Also, Human Rights Watch (2021b) posits that in May 2018,
Palestine had formally asked the ICC prosecution to initiate an investigation into allegations of
serious crimes committed on its territory and affirmed its commitment to cooperate with the
court. On December 20, 2019, Amnesty International (2019b) asserts that the Office of the
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Prosecutor’s concluded its preliminary examination into the situation in Palestine by saying that
war crimes have been committed in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. However, Amnesty
International (2019b) argues that before proceeding with an investigation, the Prosecutor has
sought confirmation from the ICC’s judges that the territory over which the Court may exercise
its jurisdiction comprises the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.
Besides, International Federation for Human Rights (2021) declares that on February 5,
2021, Pre-Trial Chamber I decided that the Court's territorial jurisdiction in the situation in
Palestine extends to the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, namely Gaza and the West
Bank, including East Jerusalem. Therefore, on March 3rd, 2021, the Prosecutor announced the
opening of her investigation into the Situation in Palestine. It is noteworthy that according to
Amnesty International (2021), the alleged crimes refer to war crimes allegedly committed by
Israel, including settlement-related activities, and crimes against humanity, such as persecution,
deportation and transfer, as well as the crime of apartheid against Palestinian civilians in the
West Bank, including East Jerusalem; crimes allegedly committed by Israel and Palestinian
armed groups during the 2014 assault on Gaza and during the Great March of Return protests in
2018-19; and allegations against the Palestinian authorities in the West Bank of torture and
support for attacks against Israeli citizens.
Honduras
Honduras ratified the Rome Statute on July 1, 2002. According to the International
Criminal Court (2021m), the OTP started the preliminary examination of the situation in
Honduras on18 November 2010. It is noteworthy that the preliminary examination focused on
alleged crimes against humanity committed in the aftermath of the coup d'état of June 28, 2009,
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and January 27. In a Statement made by the Prosecutor on the conclusion of the preliminary
examination into the situation in Honduras, the Prosecutor (International Criminal Court, 2015)
said that human rights violations perpetrated between June 28, 2009, and January 27, 2010, in
Honduras do not constitute crimes against humanity within the meaning of the Statute, and thus
do not fall within the scope of the crimes the ICC has the mandate to investigate.
Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea deposited its instrument of accession to the Rome Statute on
November 13, 2002. According to the International Criminal Court press release (International
Criminal Court, 2010), the Office of the Prosecutor has received communications alleging that
North Korean forces committed war crimes in the territory of the Republic of Korea. Therefore,
the Prosecutor of the ICC at this time, Luis Moreno-Ocampo has opened a preliminary
examination on December 6, 2010, to evaluate if some incidents constitute war crimes under the
jurisdiction of the Court. He assessed whether two incidents in the Yellow Sea constituted war
crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court: the sinking of the RoK warship the Cheonan on March
26, 2010, and the shelling of the RoK island of Yeonpyeong on November 23, 2010. But, in a
statement made on June 23, 2014, the Prosecutor (International Criminal Court, 2014a)
concluded that the statutory requirements to seek authorization to initiate an investigation of the
situation in the Republic of Korea had not been satisfied. Therefore, he concluded the
preliminary examination. Nevertheless, the Prosecutor (International Criminal Court, 2014a)
stressed that if any future acts are committed on the Korean peninsula that appear to fall under
the court jurisdiction, he can conduct a preliminary examination.
Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia
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The Union of the Comoros ratified the Rome Statute on August 18, 2006. On May 14,
2013, the authorities of the Union of the Comoros sent a referral to the Office of the Prosecutor,
in relation to an alleged attack that killed 9 victims and severely injured dozens of people on
May 31, 2010, allegedly by the Israeli Defence Forces on the Humanitarian Aid Flotilla bound
for the Gaza strip. On May 14, 2013, the Prosecutor announced the opening of a preliminary
examination on the referred situation, as is done as a matter of policy in instances of referrals
from States parties. In a statement, the Prosecutor (International Criminal Court, 2014b) said that
he decided to open a preliminary examination because there was a reasonable basis to believe
that war crimes under the jurisdiction of the court were committed on one of the vessels, the
Mavi Marmara, when Israeli Defense Forces intercepted the "Gaza Freedom Flotilla'' on May 31,
2010. However, after carefully assessing all relevant considerations, he has concluded that these
incidents would not be of "sufficient gravity" to justify further action by the ICC.
Venezuela I
Venezuela ratified the Rome Statute on June 7, 2000. According to the International
Criminal Court (2021x), on February 8, 2018, the Office of the Prosecutor announced the
preliminary examination of the situation in Venezuela based on crimes allegedly committed by
State security forces in the context of demonstrations and related political unrest since at least
April 2017. Furthermore, International Federation for Human Rights (2018b) asserts that the ICC
Prosecutor noted that the demonstrations led to excessive use of force by State security forces to
disperse demonstrators and arrested and detained thousands of people and that many of those
detained have been allegedly subjected to serious abuse and ill-treatment. It was also reported
that some groups of protestors injured or killed some members of security forces.
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Moreover, Human Rights Watch (2020c) argues that on December 14, 2020, the Office
of the Prosecutor has concluded that there is a reasonable basis to believe that since at least April
2017, civilian authorities, members of the armed forces and pro-government individuals have
committed acts of crimes against humanity. It is noteworthy that the Office of the Prosecutor in
the 2020 Preliminary Examinations (International Criminal Court, 2020) asserts that the Office
will conclude the preliminary examination to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to
proceed during the first half of 2021.
Venezuela II
Reuters (2020b) posits that Venezuela asked the prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court on February 13, 2020, to investigate U.S. officials for what it called crimes against
humanity resulting from sanctions imposed by Washington. The Office of the Prosecutor in the
2020 Preliminary Examinations (International Criminal Court, 2020) asserts that the referral
made by Venezuela reveal that crimes against humanity have been committed in Venezuela
because of the application of unilateral coercive measures imposed on Venezuela by the US
Government for promoting a regime change. According to the referral, the consequences of these
measures have contributed to significant increases in mortality in children and adults, and
negatively affected a range of other human rights, including the right to food, to medical care and
to education, thus causing, in turn, a migration phenomenon from the country.
It is noteworthy that Reuters (2020b) argues that the United States has sanctioned
Venezuela because it recognizes opposition politician Juan Guaido as Venezuela’s legitimate
interim leader. Besides, in his Preliminary examinations report, the Prosecutor (International
Criminal Court, 2020) said that the OTP will conclude its assessment of subject matter
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jurisdiction in the first half of 2021 to determine whether there is a basis to proceed to an
admissibility assessment.
Colombia
Colombia ratified the Rome Statute on August 5, 2002. The International Criminal Court
(2021f) asserts that the OTP has received numerous communications in relation to the situation
in Colombia and decided to conduct preliminary examination in June 2004. According to the
Coalition for the International Criminal Court (2021e), the ICC prosecutor opened a preliminary
examination to assess whether to formally investigate alleged crimes against humanity and war
crimes by government, rebel, and paramilitary forces, considering the progress of peace talks in
Colombia. In its Preliminary examination report, the OTP (International Criminal Court, 2020)
says that alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes have been committed in the context of
the armed conflict between and among government forces, paramilitary armed groups and rebel
armed groups since November 1, 2002. Also, the Coalition for the International Criminal Court
(2021e) posits that these crimes had been committed by the Colombian army, guerrilla actors
like FARC and the National Liberation Army, and paramilitary groups.
In its Preliminary examinations report, the OTP (International Criminal Court, 2020)
argues that it has continued to assess the progress of domestic proceedings related to the
commission of crimes that form the potential cases that would form the focus of its preliminary
examination. Also, it will identify the indicators that would allow the Office to conclude whether
it should either proceed to open an investigation or defer to national accountability processes as a
consequence of relevant and genuine domestic proceedings.
Bolivia
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The Plurinational State of Bolivia deposited its instrument of ratification of the Rome
Statute on June 27, 2002. U.S.News (2020) says that Bolivia referred to the chief prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court the situation in Bolivia on September 4, 2020. Therefore, the
Prosecutor decided to conduct a preliminary examination on September 9, 2020. U.S.News
(2020) asserts that the preliminary examination was focused on alleged crimes against humanity
committed by the former President Evo Morales and his supporters by setting up roadblocks
aimed at preventing people from accessing vital health care during the coronavirus pandemic.
Besides, in its Preliminary Examinations report, the OTP (International Criminal Court, 2020)
posits that the Office will conclude its assessment of subject matter jurisdiction in the first half of
2021 to determine whether there is a basis to proceed to an admissibility assessment.
Republic of the Philippines
According to the International Criminal Court (2021t), The Philippines ratified the Rome
Statute on August 30, 2011. But the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (2021k) says
that The Philippines withdrew from the Rome Statute on March 17, 2018, and the withdrawal
became effective on March 17, 2019. Moreover, Amnesty International (2019c) asserts that in
February 2018, the International Criminal Court launched a preliminary examination of the
crimes allegedly committed by the Philippine government in the context of the war on drugs
since at least July 1, 2016.
Human Rights Watch (2019d) declares that President Rodrigo Duterte has instigated the
police and incited police-backed vigilantes to summarily execute suspected drug dealers and
users. Also, Amnesty International (2019c) asserts that President Duterte has also suggested that
the murder of people suspected of using and selling drugs, whether committed by police or
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civilian actors, will go unpunished. Besides, the preliminary examination is at the admissibility
stage that includes complementarity and gravity. It is noteworthy that the OTP (International
Criminal Court, 2020) in its Preliminary examinations report declares that the Office will reach a
decision on whether to seek authorization to open an investigation into the situation in the
Philippines in the first half of 2021.
Iraq/UK
The Coalition for the International Criminal Court (2021g) says that Iraq is not a state
party to the Rome Statute, but the United Kingdom ratified the Rome Statute. That is why the
Court has jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed by United Kingdom troops following the
2003 invasion of Iraq. Moreover, according to Amnesty International (2020a), on May 13, 2014,
the Prosecutor launched a preliminary examination focused on alleged war crimes committed by
UK nationals in the context of the Iraq conflict from 2003 to 2008. Human Rights Watch
(2020b) declares that on December 9, 2020, the Prosecutor announced that her office will not
pursue a formal investigation into alleged war crimes by United Kingdom nationals in the
context of the Iraq conflict and occupation between 2003 and 2008. Indeed, Bowcott (2020)
asserts that even though the Prosecutor found that the UK armed forces committed war crimes in
Iraq in 2003 and that victims had been deprived of justice by the UK authorities, she concluded
there was no proof that UK authorities had blocked any investigations or were unwilling to
pursue them.
Bangladesh/Myanmar
Myanmar did not ratify the Rome Statute but according to Human Rights Watch (2019c),
the court has jurisdiction over crimes committed in Bangladesh, a state party that ratified the
Rome Statute in 2010. The OTP (International Criminal Court, 2019) in its 2019 preliminary
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examinations report declared that on September 18, 2018, the Prosecutor announced the opening
of a preliminary examination. The preliminary examination focused on alleged deportation of the
Rohingya people from Myanmar to Bangladesh committed by Myanmar nationals, as well as
potentially other crimes under the Rome Statute. Also, International Federation for Human
Rights (2019b) asserts that in addition to the crime of deportation, the crime of persecution on
grounds of ethnicity and/or religion has also been committed. Additional crimes that may fall
under the Court’s jurisdiction may be identified during the Prosecutor’s investigation. On July 4,
2019, the Prosecutor requested the Pre-trial Chamber to authorize an investigation on alleged
crimes against humanity, such as deportation, other inhumane acts and persecution, committed
against the civilian Rohingya population in Myanmar in the period since 9 October 2016.
Besides, the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (2021b) posits that on July 4,
2019, the Prosecutor requested the Pre-trial chamber to authorize an investigation on alleged
crimes against humanity, such as deportation, other inhumane acts and persecution, committed
against the civilian Rohingya population in Myanmar in the period since October 9, 2016.
Therefore, UN News (2019) declares that on November 14, 2019, judges of the International
Criminal Court authorized an investigation into alleged crimes against humanity, namely
deportation, which have forced between 600,000 and one million Rohingya refugees out of
Myanmar, into neighboring Bangladesh since 2016.
Afghanistan
The International Criminal Court (2021a) asserts that Afghanistan deposited its
instrument of accession to the Rome Statute on February 10, 2003. The prosecutor decided to
conduct a preliminary examination of the situation in Afghanistan in 2007. The International
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Criminal Court (2021a) declares that the preliminary examination focused on crimes against
humanity and war crimes allegedly committed by members of Afghan and foreign government
forces, including the CIA and American forces, and by anti-government forces such as the
Taliban. According to the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (2021a), the prosecutor
filed on November 20, 2017, a request to open an investigation before the judges of the Pre-Trial
Chamber, which was rejected on April 12, 2019. Indeed, International Federation for Human
Rights (2020) posits that the Pre-trial Chamber had found that the beginning of an investigation
would not be in the interests of justice. Therefore, the prosecutor filed an appeal to challenge this
decision of the Pre-trial chamber. Besides, International Federation for Human Rights (2020)
declares that the Appeals Chamber found that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s rejection of the
investigation failed to consider the gravity of crimes and the interests of victims. Therefore, the
Appeals Chamber of the Court unanimously decided to authorize an investigation into war
crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed on the territory of Afghanistan.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
The International Criminal Court (2021i) asserts that The Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC) ratified the Rome Statute in April 2002 and in April 2004, the government
referred the situation in its territory since July 1, 2002, to the ICC. Amnesty International (2004)
posits that after conducting a preliminary examination, the prosecutor announced in June 2004
that the office will begin investigations of crimes against humanity and war crimes committed
during the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) specifically in eastern DRC, in
the Ituri region and the North and South Kivu Provinces, since July 1, 2002.
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Human Rights Watch (2020a) argues that the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has
publicly brought cases against six individuals, all former rebel leaders such as Thomas Lubanga,
Germain Katanga, Bosco Ntaganda, Callixte Mbarushimana, Sylvestre Mudacumura, and
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui. Moreover, according to the International Criminal Court (2021i), the
Pre-Trial Chamber did not confirm the charges against Callixte Mbarushimana; Mathieu
Ngudjolo Chui has been acquitted by the trial chamber, and Sylvestre Mudacumura is still at
large. Apart from these three cases, the other cases resulted in important achievements, including
the historic convictions of Thomas Lubanga, Germain Katanga, and Bosco Ntaganda for war
crimes and crimes against humanity.
Uganda
According to the International Criminal Court (2021w), in June 2002, Uganda ratified the
Rome Statute. Mills (2012) says that on December 16, 2003, Uganda referred the situation in its
territory. Moreover, the Prosecutor opened investigations on July 2004 based on alleged war
crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the context of an armed conflict
predominantly between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the national authorities, mainly
in Northern Uganda, since July 1, 2002. Furthermore, Mills (2012) asserts that the investigation
conducted by the Prosecutor resulted in the issuance of arrest warrants for Lord's Resistance
Army leader Joseph Kony and four of his top lieutenants: Vincen Otti, Dominic Ongwen, Raska
Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo. The cases against Raska Lukwiya and Okot Odhiambo were
terminated when their death was confirmed. The court sentenced Dominic Ongwen while
Vincent Otti and Joseph Kony are still at large.
Darfur/Sudan
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Amnesty International (2020c) asserts that Sudan did not ratify the Rome Statute, but the
court has jurisdiction over crimes committed in Sudan because of the referral of the United
Nations Security Council of the situation in March 2005. Moreover, the Coalition for the
International Criminal Court (2021m) said that the Prosecutor opened the investigations that
were focused on allegations of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in
Darfur, Sudan, since July 1, 2002, by Sudanese officials, Janjaweed militia and rebel forces.
Besides, the International Criminal Court (2021h) posits that the investigation has led to several
cases against former President Omar Al-Bashir, Ahmad Harun, Abdallah Banda, Abu Garda,
Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman. It is noteworthy that
according to the International Criminal Court (2021h), Omar Al-Bashir, Ahmad Harun, Abdallah
Banda, and Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein are still at large while Ali Muhammad Ali AbdAl-Rahman is in the court’s custody and the opening of the confirmation of charges hearing is
scheduled provisionally for May 24, 2021.The Pre-Trial Chamber did not confirm the charges
against Abu Garda.
Central African Republic
According to the International Criminal Court (2021c), Central African Republic ratified
the Rome Statute on October 3, 2001, and referred the situation in its territory on December 2004
to the ICC. Moreover, Mills (2012) argues that in 2005, at the request of the government, the
ICC launched an investigation in the Central African Republic, leading to the arrest and pre-trial
detention of Jean-Pierre Bemba. Furthermore, Justice Initiative (2016) posits that the ICC's
investigation in CAR I focused on alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity crimes
allegedly committed during an armed conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) between
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October 26, 2002, and March 15, 2003. It is noteworthy that the Coalition for the International
Criminal Court (2021d) argues that Jean-Pierre Bemba has been convicted and sentenced by the
trial Chamber in 2016. But AlJazeera (2018) posits that in 2018, the Appeals Chamber of the
Court reversed the conviction of Jean-Pierre Bemba and acquitted him for war crimes and crimes
against humanity. Besides, the International Criminal Court (2021c) asserts that Jean-Pierre
Bemba was also accused with four other suspects (Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques
Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido) of offenses against
administration of justice committed in the context of his trial.
Furthermore, International Justice Resource Center (2016) says that the trial Chamber of
the International Criminal Court (ICC) found Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and four others guilty
of offenses against the administration of justice. According to the International Justice Resource
Center (2016), the court found that that Bemba and the four other accused had bribed witnesses
and presented false evidence to the Court in relation to Bemba’s prosecution before the ICC for
war crimes and crimes against humanity. Moreover, the International Criminal Court (2021c)
argues that convictions and acquittals in relation to all five accused are now final and
imprisonment sentences were served.
Kenya
The International Criminal Court (2021n) posits that Kenya ratified the Rome Statute on
March 15, 2005. Furthermore, Magliveras and Naldi (2013) posit that in March 2010, the PreTrial Chamber granted the Prosecutor's request to open an investigation proprio motu in the
situation in Kenya, in relation to crimes against humanity within the jurisdiction of the Court
committed between June 1, 2005, and November 26, 2009. The International Criminal Court
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(2021n) asserts that ICC investigations have focused on alleged crimes against humanity
committed in the context of post-election violence in Kenya in 2007/2008, in six of the eight
Kenyan Provinces: Nairobi, North Rift Valley, Central Rift Valley, South Rift Valley, Nyanza
Province and Western Province.
According to the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (2021h), the investigation
led to 6 individuals suspected of committing crimes against humanity such as Henry Kosgey,
Deputy President William Ruto, Joshua Sang, President Unhuru Kenyatta, Francis Muthaura,
and Mohammed Hussein Ali. It is noteworthy that Human Rights Watch (2016b) declares that
the charges against Ruto and Sang have been vacated by the court while the charges against
President Kenyatta, Francis Muthaura, and Mohammed Hussein Ali have been withdrawn due to
insufficient evidence.
Besides, Human Rights Watch (2016) asserts that the court issued arrest warrants against
Paul Gicheru and Philip Kipkoech Bett on March 10, 2015, for offences against the
administration of justice consisting of in corruptly influencing witnesses regarding cases from
the situation in Kenya. Indeed, according to the International Criminal Court (2021n), Paul
Gicheru is in ICC custody and the confirmation of charges is scheduled for 2021.
Libya
Libya is not a state party to the Rome Statute. According to the International Criminal
Court (2021o), the United Nations Security Council referred the Libya situation to the court in
February 2011 and the Prosecutor opened an investigation in March 2011. Also, the Coalition for
the International Criminal Court (2021i) posits that the investigation focused on alleged crimes
against humanity and war crimes and led to arrest warrants against five suspects: Saif Al-Islam
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Gaddafi, Muammar Gaddafi, Abdullah Al-Senussi, Al-Tuhamy Mohamed Khaled, and
Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf Al-Werfalli. Furthermore, the International Criminal Court (2021o)
says that the cases against Abdullah Al-Senussi and Muammar Gaddafi were terminated due to
the death of Gaddafi and the inadmissibility of the case against Al-Senussi while Saif Al-Islam
Gaddafi, Al-Tuhamy Mohamed Khaled, and Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf Al-Werfalli are still at
large.
Cote d’Ivoire
Cote d’Ivoire accepted the jurisdiction of the court in 2003 and ratified the Rome Statute
on February 15, 2013. According to Corey-Bouley (2012), ICC Prosecutor opens proprio motu
investigations after authorization of Pre-trial Chamber on October 3, 2011. The investigation led
to two cases: Gbagbo and Ble Goude case and Simone Gbagbo. Besides, the Pre-trial chamber
confirmed the charges against Gbagbo and Ble Goude but according to Amnesty International
(2019a) and International Federation for Human Rights (2019a), on January 15, 2019, the trial
Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) decided, by majority, to acquit former
Ivorian president Laurent Gbagbo and his former minister Charles Blé Goudé from all charges of
crimes against humanity.
Besides, according to the International Criminal Court (2021g), the court issued an arrest
warrant against former first lady Simone Gbagbo on February 29, 2012. But Cote d’Ivoire’s
government officials refused de transfer the first lady in the Hague. Human Rights Watch
(2019b) asserts that they tried her and acquitted her for charges war crimes and crimes against
humanity in March 2017.
Mali
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According to the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (2021j), Mali ratified the
Rome Statute on August 16, 2000, and referred the situation in its territory to the ICC in July
2012. Furthermore, the International Criminal Court (2021p) asserts that the Prosecutor opened
an investigation in January 2013 based on allegations of war crimes committed in Mali since
January 2012 mainly in three northern regions, Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, with certain incidents
in Bamako and Sévaré, in the south. The investigation led to two cases against Ahmad Al Faqi
Al Mahdi and Al Hassan Ag. Moreover, Kersten (2016c) asserts that the court convicted and
sentenced Al Mahdi as a co-perpetrator of the war crime consisting of in intentionally directing
attacks against religious and historic buildings in Timbuktu, Mali, in June and July 2012.
Besides, according to Reuters (2019), the judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed the charges
against Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz and said there were substantial grounds to believe that he was
responsible for crimes against humanity and war crimes, including sexual and gender-based
persecution, rape, torture, sexual slavery, and the directing of attacks against religious and
historical buildings.
Central African Republic II
The government referred the situation to the court in May 2014 and the Prosecutor
opened an investigation in September 2014. According to the International Criminal Court
(2021e), the ICC's investigation focused on alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed in the context of a conflict since August 1, 2012, by both Muslim Séléka and
Christian anti-balaka groups. According to Human Rights Watch (2021a), the investigation led to
two cases: Yekatom and Ngaïssona case and Said case. Indeed, Human Rights Watch (2021a)
and the International Criminal Court (2021d) assert that Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona and Alfred
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Yékatom who are the highest ranking anti-balaka leaders face charges of war crimes and crimes
against humanity. The International Criminal Court (2021d) posits that the Pre-Trial Chamber
confirmed the charges against Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona and Alfred Yékatom and the opening
of the trial is scheduled for February 16, 2021. Besides, Human Rights Watch (2021a) argues
that Mahamat Said, the first Seleka rebel is in the court’s custody and is accused of war crimes
and crimes against humanity committed in Bangui in 2013.The opening of the confirmation of
charges hearing was scheduled provisionally for October 5, 2021.
Burundi
According to the International Criminal Court (2021b), Burundi ratified the Rome Statute
on September 21, 2004. But BBC (2017) declares that Burundi withdrew from the Rome Statute,
and the withdrawal took effect on October 27, 2017. The preliminary examination of the
situation in Burundi was announced on April 25, 2016. Despite the withdrawal of Burundi, the
Prosecutor opened an investigation proprio motu on October 25, 2017. Indeed, the Coalition for
the International Criminal Court (2021c) asserts that in its decision authorizing an investigation,
the Chamber found a reasonable basis to believe that State agents and groups implementing State
policies, together with members of the "Imbonerakure allegedly committed crimes against
humanity between April 26, 2015, and October 26, 2017. Besides, the Prosecutor is still
investigating the situation.
Nigeria
Nigeria ratified the Rome Statute on September 27, 2001. The International Criminal
Court (2021q) asserts that the Prosecutor decided to conduct a preliminary examination of the
situation in Nigeria on November 18, 2010. The prosecutor conducts the preliminary
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examination based on alleged crimes committed during an armed conflict, largely between
Nigerian security forces and the terrorist group Boko Haram.
According to Ochab (2020), on December 11, 2020, the Prosecutor announced the
completion of her preliminary examination of the situation in Nigeria, having concluded that
there was a reasonable basis to believe that war crimes and crimes against humanity were
committed by members of Boko Haram and its splinter groups. It is noteworthy that Amnesty
International (2020b) asserts that crimes against humanity and war crimes have also been
committed by Nigerian security forces. Moreover, the International Criminal Court (2021q)
declares that the next step in the judicial process is to request authorization from the Pre-Trial
Chamber to open an investigation into the situation in Nigeria.
Guinea
Guinea ratified the Rome Statute on July 14, 2003. According to the OTP preliminary
examinations report of 2020 (International Criminal Court, 2020), the situation in Guinea has
been under preliminary examination since October 14, 2009. The preliminary examination
focused on alleged crimes against humanity committed in the context of the September 28, 2009,
events at the Conakry stadium. It is noteworthy that in its preliminary examinations report, the
OTP (International Criminal Court, 2020) declares that the preliminary examination is at the
admissibility stage that includes both complementarity and gravity.
Gabon
Gabon ratified the Rome Statute on September 20, 2000. According to the International
Criminal Court (2021j), on September 21, 2016, the Government of the Gabonese Republic send
a referral regarding alleged crimes that had been taking place in Gabon surrounding the
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presidential election since May 2016 to the Prosecutor. Therefore, on September 29, 2016, the
Prosecutor announced the opening of a preliminary examination into the situation in Gabon.
Besides, Behles (2018), on September 21, 2018, the Prosecutor concluded that the information
available did not provide a reasonable basis to believe that the acts allegedly committed in
Gabon in the context of the 2016 post-election violence, either by members of the opposition or
by the Gabonese security forces, constitute crimes against humanity and the crime of incitement
to genocide and decided to close the preliminary examination.
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Chapter 3: RESEARCH METHOD
Research Method & Delimiters
This is a qualitative exploratory research that sought to explore the different perspectives
on the International Criminal Court. Indeed, according to Bachman and Schutt (2017), the goal
of an exploratory research is to investigate social phenomena without expectations. Therefore, in
this study, I explore and find out how the implementation of the court is being received or
perceived by scholars. I do not describe the operations of the court, but I look at patterns of
thoughts or responses related to the implementation of the court.
The research method I use is an inductive content analysis of the texts within 21st
Century from 2002 to present that explore the assessments made by scholars (i.e., support,
oppose, neutral) of the International Criminal Court and the role of the court in Africa. Besides,
in this study I analyze the different materials to identify textual similarities. This is accomplished
by consolidating codified text or words. Moreover, in this study, I extract words (i.e., texts)
presented as part of said explanations, correlate them with other words of similar meaning into
categories, and then organize these under classes. It is noteworthy that I do not analyze the
materials that are related to the 14 situations under preliminary examinations or investigations
outside Africa.
Research Populations & Sampling
The target population for this study is all 21st Century literature (research articles and
reports, government documents, and appropriate Internet resources) that address the 12 cases in
Africa, and which present the critics’assessments (i.e., oppose, support, and neutral) of the
International Criminal Court and its role in Africa. To establish a sampling frame (a.k.a, survey
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population) I used search engines (JSTOR; Sage Journals; Taylor & Francis online; Project
Muse; EBSCO Host Academic Search Premier, Cambridge University Press, and Google) to
identify those textual materials available in either hardcopy or electronic formats. The sample
population (n=40) for this study is those textual materials that have been selected using a
nonprobability, purposive sampling technique. According to Bachman and Schutt (2017),
nonprobability samples comprise elements within a population that do not have a known
probability of being selected into the sample.
Furthermore, Bachman and Schutt (2017) assert that “a purposive sampling is a
nonprobability sampling method in which elements are selected for a purpose, usually because of
their unique position”. A nonrandom sample population is derived in the following manner.
First, an available sample population is identified by those works that could be acquired in
hardcopy or electronic mediums. Next, an actual or final sample population is determined by
examining obtained texts related to the International Criminal Court in Africa.
Conceptualization
International Criminal Court
The International Criminal Court is an international and a permanent court that has been
established under the Rome Statute on July 17, 1998. It is established in The Hague in the
Netherlands. Moreover, the International Criminal Court investigates and, where warranted, tries
individuals charged with the gravest crimes of concern to the international community: genocide,
war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression.
Genocide
The crime of genocide is an international crime that first appeared in Resolution (96-1)
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adopted on December 11, 1946, by the United Nations General Assembly. But the term genocide
was used by Raphael Lemkin in 1944 in his book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe to refer to the
systematic extermination of Jews by the Nazis. Resolution (96-1) of the UN General Assembly
presents genocide as a crime which has inflicted great losses on humanity, and which is
condemned by the international community. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 9, 1948, defined
genocide as any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy in whole or in part a
national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. These acts include killing members of the group;
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and forcibly transferring children
of the group to another group. Furthermore, the International Criminal Court used the same
definition in the Article 6 of the Rome Statute.
Crimes against humanity
There are different definitions of crimes against humanity. Indeed, international tribunals
such as the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda defined crimes
against humanity differently. But I use the definition of crimes against humanity given by the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court that is the most recent definition. The Rome
Statute defines eleven acts constituting crimes against humanity when committed "as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population and with knowledge of
the attack". These eleven acts include murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation or
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forcible transfer of population; imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in
violation of fundamental rules of international law; torture; rape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of
comparable gravity; persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial,
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are
universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act
referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; enforced
disappearance of persons; the crime of apartheid; other inhumane acts of a similar character
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
Operationalization
In this study, I refer to everything that is related to the International Criminal Court
especially its involvement in Africa. I do not include other international tribunals.
Data Collection, Processing & Analysis
Recording Sheet
I use a data collection instrument to collect the data. The data collection instrument is
constructed to record criteria of selection and recovered texts, as well as citation and
bibliography data. It includes a block for assigning a one-up serialization for in-house tracking
(e.g., 1, 2, and so forth). It also contains blocks for recording the following information: year of
publication, name(s) of author(s), short title, location, publisher, and recovered textual
explanations (also recorded verbatim and annotated with the page number(s) where it was
located). By recording the criteria of selection as found, one could refer back to them as guides
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for further retrievals and to aid in sorting the filing system. An example of the data collection
instrument used in this study is provided in Appendix A.
Filing System
A spreadsheet format using computer software served as an excellent heuristic device to
construct a filing system (3 examples may be found in Appendices B, C, and D). The columns
comprise the categories while the rows are used to record the source of retrieved texts. After
entering the source information in a blank cell on row one, each cell of column one is checked to
determine whether any entries had already been made that were lexically similar. If such an
entry is found, then an “X” is placed in the appropriate cell respective to the source column and
row for that entry. If no entry is found, then a new entry is made in proximity to retrieved texts
that reflected related underlying abstract concepts and an “X” is placed in the appropriate
column/row cell.
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Chapter 4: ANALYSIS and FINDINGS
This study is designed to explore the different perspectives on the International Criminal
Court. The research method used is an inductive content analysis of the texts within 21st
Century from 2002 to present. Open coding and a filing system are used to accomplish this
study’s content analysis. In the end, the filing system has three classes with seventeen categories.
They are: Class 1) Support: “Promotes anti-impunity”, “Promotes deterrence”, “ Promotes
domestic prosecutions”, “ Provides hope for victims and civilians”, “ Promotes respect for
victims’rights”, “ Provides accountability”, “ Provides international justice and peace”, “ Is not
biased” , and “Is not targeting only Africa”; Class 2) Oppose: “Is selective”, “ Is targeting only
Africa”, “ Is instrumentalized by states”, “ Is instrumentalized by UNSC”, and “Is endangering
peace and reconciliation”; Class 3) Neutral: “ Divided opinions among African states”,
“ Selectivity of States’ support and cooperation”, and “ Is not promoting deterrence”.
Readers are encouraged to utilize the filing system spreadsheets (Appendices B, C, and
D) and sorted lists found in Appendices E (Filing System Citations Sorted on Recording Sheet
Number) and F (Filing System Citations Sorted on Year of Original Publication). By examining
the filing system spreadsheets and noting the recording sheet numbers associated with a
particular thematic subject, a reader can cross-reference this with the sorted lists to identify the
respective bibliographic entries for further, personal study.
Class 1: Support
Eighteen (18) authors provided 35 comments that can be considered “Support” regarding
the International Criminal Court. Those comments were analyzed and organized for lexical
similarity (Ganeson, 2021). The comments were then examined more closely for semantic
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similarity (i.e., actual meaning of the words and the comment) and 9 categories emerged: 1)
Promotes anti-impunity, 2) Promotes deterrence, 3) Promotes domestic prosecutions, 4) Provides
hope for victims and civilians, 5) Promotes respect for victims’rights, 6) Provides accountability,
7) Provides international justice and peace, 8) Is not biased, and 9) Is not targeting only Africans.
Category 1: Promotes Anti-Impunity
My analysis found that, in the first category, 3 authors offered 4 comments. Category 1(
“Promotes anti-impunity”) was evidenced by such remarks as, “By indicting heads of
government, the ICC marks the end of impunity of leaders who do not take steps to protect their
citizens, or actively do them harm” (Gegout, 2013, p.809); “But its willingness to prosecute has
contributed to perceptions that impunity for egregious crimes against humanity is a diminishing
option”(Jo & Simmons, 2016, p.470); “This study reiterates the importance of the anti-impunity
norm of the ICC as an instrument of equity, especially when African leaders are involved”
(Okpe, 2020, p.1); “The right to impunity goes directly against the anti-impunity principle of the
ICC” (Okpe, 2020, p.4).
Category 2: Promotes Deterrence
My analysis found that, in the second category, 6 authors offered 9 comments. Category
2 ( “Promotes deterrence”) was evidenced by such remarks as, “The creation of the ICC has not
only provided justice for those affected by international crimes but has also served as a form of
deterrence to others who may consider committing international offenses” (Okpe, 2020,p.11);
“We have argued that the ICC contributes directly to prosecutorial deterrence by investigating
and prosecuting international crimes on its own authority”(Jo and Simmons, 2016, p.469);
“Indeed, ratifying states are much more likely than nonratifiers to do so” (Jo & Simmons, p.469);
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“The ICC also deters because it mobilizes the international community as well as domestic civil
society to demand justice” ( Jo & Simmons, p.469); “The ICC could have a deterrent effect and
prevent future atrocities” (Gegout, 2013, p.809); “The ICC is viewed as contributing to
deterrence in Côte d’ Ivoire, by promoting general deterrence through its investigations and
prosecutions” (Malu, 2016, p.851); “I argue that governments from states that have ratified the
Rome Statute commit lower levels of human rights abuses than governments from nonratifier
leaders” (Appel, 2018, p.4); “I posit that the ICC can deter ratifiers from committing violations
because it imposes costs on them throughout its involvement in a situation that include
imprisonment, but also a variety of domestic and international audience costs” (Appel, 2018,
p.4); “The results of the field study show that the ICC contributes to general deterrence in the
three countries with varying results. It shows that the ICC contributes to general deterrence by
challenging the culture of impunity, through its investigations and prosecutions, and by
contributing to the promotion of accountability to the law” (Malu, 2019, p.214).
Category 3: Promotes Domestic Prosecutions
My analysis found that, in the third category, 5 authors offered 5 comments. Category 3
(“Promotes domestic prosecutions”) was evidenced by such remarks as, “It also encourages
member states to improve their capacity to reduce, detect, and prosecute such crimes
domestically” ( Jo & Simmons, 2016, p.469); “For Kenya, the ICC case, together with the new
constitution and a reformed electoral law, may be a factor in the process of strengthening the
judiciary and may signal an end to ineffective commissions of inquiry. It could also potentially
shake up the traditional belief that office automatically brings immunity from criminal
investigation. (Hohn, 2014, pp.582-583); “We theorize that the launch of a formal ICC
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investigation of a particular country is associated with a spike in domestic prosecutions for all
human rights violations, and further, that this effect is larger than the impact of the target state’s
ratification of the Rome Statute or the Prosecutor’s decision to begin a preliminary examination”
(Dancy & Montal, 2017, p.694) ; “More attention should be paid to the ICC’s potential as an
active player on national justice. Under the concept of “positive complementarity” it can serve as
part of a wide array of efforts to press and support national authorities to carry out genuine
investigations and prosecutions” (Evenson et al., 2018, para.3); “There has been substantial
progress in Guinea, in particular, where the OTP’s engagement has been more intense than in
other situations and where over time the OTP as an external point of pressure seems to have
contributed to progress by national officials and the engagement of other key international actors
on justice” (Human Rights Watch, 2018, p.6)
Category 4: Provides Hope for Victims and Civilians
My analysis found that, in the fourth category, 3 authors offered 3 comments. Category 4
(“Provides hope for victims and civilians”) was evidenced by such remarks as, “The use of
international criminal lawfare can be a practical and effective means of lessening the negative
effects of conflict on civilians, with indictments and arrests removing criminal actors from the
stage of war and therefore altering the trajectory of the war and influencing the actions of
belligerents” (Fisher & Stefan, 2016, p.253) ; “Until such a time that African states establish
independent, professional judiciaries, the ICC probably will remain a contested court of first
instance and potentially the only hope for victims seeking justice for the worst crimes” (Cannon
et al., 2016, p.25) ; “Thus, the mere existence of the Court, and its Statute, which articulates
complex but innovative procedures, strengthens international criminal law and also represents
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hope for victims of international crimes” ( Malu, 2019, p.11).
Category 5: Promotes Respect for Victims’Rights
My analysis found that, in the fifth category, 2 authors offered 2 comments. Category 5
(“Promotes respect for victims’ rights”) was evidenced by such remarks as, “The article argues
that the ICC promotes respect for victims’ rights by enabling some victims to participate in its
proceedings in The Hague, though the number of persons involved in the current proceeding at
The Hague is minimal, and the impact may not tickle down to many victims of the conflicts in
the country” (Malu, 2016, p.851) ; “In this context, Al Hassan’s trial is an important step in
advancing the goals enshrined in the international system of women’s rights and in the
adjudication of gender-based persecution” ( Epure, 2020, para.14).
Category 6: Provides Accountability
My analysis found that, in the sixth category, 5 authors offered 6 comments. Category 5
(“Provides accountability”) was evidenced by such remarks as, “Justice must be served for every
crime committed, and because the judicial institutions of the AU are still growing, the ICC is
Africa’s final hope of holding its leaders responsible for offenses committed” (Okpe, 2020, p.12)
; “It was argued that the ICC influences accountability to the law, by challenging impunity which
has also gingered the government to prosecute some of those who committed crimes in the
country” (Malu, 2016, p.850) ; “The court represented a real opportunity for accountability for
those who had for so long acted with impunity, justice for those that had for so long suffered
without hope, and a deterrent safeguard against future abuses” (Austin & Thieme, 2016, p.346) ;
“Having Mr. al-Mahdi convicted is a win for the ICC. But it must also lead to additional
accountability for the crimes committed against the civilians of Mali on all sides” (Kersten,

61
2016c, para.8) ; “The conviction of Jean-Pierre Bemba for war crimes and crimes against
humanity marked the first time the ICC issued a conviction for rape as a war crime and crime
against humanity, as well as the first time the ICC “applied the principle of command or superior
responsibility” (Kenney & Norris, 2018, p.33) ; “Bemba’s conviction was also significant in that
he was a former vice president of the DRC and militia leader, and he was the only person
arrested for war crimes in CAR during this period” (Kenney & Norris, 2018, p.33).
Category 7: Provides International Justice and Peace
My analysis found that, in the seventh category, 5 authors offered 5 comments. Category
7 (“Provides international justice and peace”) was evidenced by such remarks as, “However, the
ICC could contribute significantly to the promotion of international justice and peace, and have a
major impact on the prevention of crime, since its prosecutions represent a clear threat to highly
placed individuals who commit serious crimes” (Gegout, 2013, p.808); “For international
criminal justice in Africa, the Kenya hearing is the first instance in which an international
criminal court has started to investigate violence in a consolidated democracy rather than in
connection with ongoing armed conflict” (Hohn, 2014, p.582); “Despite these criticisms, the ICC
can potentially contribute positively towards conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Africa, and
elsewhere” (Cannon et al., 2016, p.28) ; “The trial of Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi at the
International Criminal Court represents a number of firsts for global justice. It is the first time
that the destruction of cultural sites has been prosecuted as a war crime at the ICC. It is the first
time that an Islamic radical has been prosecuted at the ICC. And it is the first time that anyone
facing judges in The Hague has pleaded guilty” (Kersten, 2016c, para.1); and “Through its work,
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based on its complementarity policy, the ICC promotes a global standard of international justice”
(Malu, 2019, p.11).
Category 8: Is Not Biased
My analysis found that, in the eighth category, 13 authors offered 18 comments. Category
8 (“Is not biased”) was evidenced by such remarks as, “The majority of the cases initiated by the
ICC were opened by national governments, a few were referred by the UNSC and only the
Kenyan case was opened by the ICC” (Opke, 2020, p.10) ; “Kenyans who identify as witnesses
or victims of violence in 2007 are much less likely to agree that the ICC is biased against Africa”
(Dancy et al., 2019, p.2) ; “Evaluating the two key aspects of the postcolonial critique, the author
concludes that the ICC is unfairly accused of practicing selective prosecution and also the
critique that the ICC is a hegemonic tool of Western countries is not true as African countries
played an essential role in its formation” (Schneider, 2020, p.90) ; “States in Africa are likely to
be the frequent users of the ICC because of two main factors; namely a relatively higher
prevalence of conflicts and serious human rights violations, and a general lack of credible legal
systems to address them” (Schneider, 2020, p.98) ; “The characterization of the ICC as a tool of
Western imperialism can be rejected insofar as that there was a strong involvement of African
governments and civil society organizations in the drafting of the RS and the establishment of
the ICC” (Schneider, 2020, p.99) ; “Except for Sudan’s Al-Bashir indictment and the
investigation in Libya that came at the urging of the UNSC, and the Kenyan case which the ICC
brought on its own, all other investigations including situations in Uganda, Congo and Mali have
come at the urging, or encouragement, of African countries” (Cannon et al., 2016, p.15) ;
“Although the ICC possesses weaknesses and flaws, including being politicized, it is a bit of a

63
stretch to argue that it is neocolonial and beholden to Western powers bearing in mind Africa’s
primary role in its establishment” (Cannon et al., 2016, p.28) ; “The claim that the ICC unfairly
targets Africans is arguably the most untenable of the AU’s arguments because as has already
been indicated above, four of the nine African situations before the ICC arose out of member
state party referrals while the Darfur situation was a SCRR referral” (Chigara & Nwankwo,
p.264) ; “Despite the machinations of some in the African Union, the evidence does not support
the claim that the ICC is racist or anti-African” (Austin & Thieme, 2016, p.348) ; “It seems
somewhat disingenuous to complain of racial targeting when it is African governments
themselves asking for the court to intervene” (Austin & Thieme, 2016, p.345) ; “The fact
remains, however, that Africa has been the primary focus of the ICC, not because of race, but
because Africa, at least during the early years of the court, was the area of the world most in
need of intervention and judicial accountability, and the area of the world least able to prevent
atrocities being committed with impunity because of the inadequacy of many African nations’
judicial systems” (Austin & Thieme, 2016, p.348) ; “Many African states simply do not have
solid judicial systems and therefore lack the capacity to act” (Vilmer, 2016, p.1329) ; “I continue
to maintain that the Court is neither biased against Africa, neo-colonial, nor racist. Africa is not
monolithic and many states continue to support the ICC and its mandate” (Kersten, 2016d,
para.2) ; “It is time to tell those who complain that the Court is targeting Africa that the true
position is that it is rather African victims who are accessing their Court in pursuit of justice”
(Mue, 2016, para.8); “Finally, it is important to note a silver lining in the acquittal of Gbagbo,
namely that it makes it more difficult to sustain the argument that the ICC “hunts” African
statesmen. The expectation that the ICC seeks only to lock away despotic African leaders is
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weakened when the likes of Kenyatta, Bemba, and Gbagbo are set free” (Kersten, 2019, States
Parties and the ‘International Community, para.15); “Firstly, there is not a single situation in
Africa where the ICC has intervened in which the Court should not have opened an official
investigation. Each and every one warranted an ICC intervention” (Kersten, 2015a,The AfricaICC Relationship – More and Less than Meets the Eye, para.13) ; “The Court is simply
misunderstood and is, in fact, a court for not against Africa” (Kersten, 2016d, para.1) ; “The ICC
involvement in some countries of Africa is justifiable on the grounds that the ICC is responding
to the invitations of African countries to intervene and also to the unduly high number of violent
conflicts in the continent” (Malu, 2019, p.88).
Category 9: Is Not Targeting Only Africans
My analysis found that, in the ninth category, 5 authors offered 5 comments. Category 9
(“Is not targeting only Africans”) was evidenced by such remarks as, “However, the ICC has
conducted preliminary investigations throughout the world: Iraq, Venezuela and Colombia
(2006); Afghanistan (2007); Georgia and Sri Lanka (2008); and Gaza, Honduras and South
Korea (2010). These investigations have not led to any indictments for various reasons: crimes
were insufficient in number, national justice systems were able to deal with the issue,
investigations are ongoing and/or the ICC cannot legally address some crimes committed in a
state non-party to the ICC Statute” (Gegout, 2013, p.808) ; “Moreover, the ICC is starting to
redeem itself from its notable absence involvement in the affairs of Western states with the
opening of investigations in Afghanistan and Georgia and of preliminary examinations in Iraq,
over the past few years” (Schneider, 2020, p.98) ; “Complaints that the ICC unfairly targets
African states are losing weight particularly as the OTP is also currently conducting preliminary
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investigations into situations in Afghanistan, Georgia, Guinea, Colombia, Honduras, Korea, and
Nigeria” (Chigara & Nwankwo, 2015, p.264) ; “It is also inaccurate to say that the court has
solely focused on Africa. The ICC is considering several other situations around the globe to
determine if those situations warrant formal investigations by the court. Such non-African
examinations include Afghanistan, Colombia, Georgia, Honduras, Korea, Iraq, and the Ukraine”
(Austin & Thieme, 2016, p.345) ; “First, the ICC has already shown an interest in other cases
outside Africa: the Office of the Prosecutor is conducting preliminary examinations in
Afghanistan, Colombia, Palestine, Ukraine, on the British military intervention in Iraq, on
registered vessels of Greece and Cambodia, and it has opened an investigation regarding a
situation in Georgia” (Vilmer, 2016, p.1332).
Class 2: Oppose
Fifteen (15) authors provided 26 comments that can be considered “Oppose” regarding
the International Criminal Court. Those comments were analyzed and organized for lexical
similarity (Ganeson, 2021). The comments were then examined more closely for semantic
similarity (i.e., actual meaning of the words and the comment) and 5 categories emerged: 1) Is
selective, 2) Is targeting only Africa, 3) Is instrumentalized by States, 4) Is instrumentalized by
UNSC, 5) Is endangering peace and reconciliation.
Category 1: Is Selective
My analysis found that, in the first category, 7 authors offered 11 comments. Category 1(
“Is selective”) was evidenced by such remarks as, “White said the lack of prosecution of forces
supporting President Alassane Ouattara could hinder the country's reconciliation effort” (Clottey,
2013, p.2) ; “The only people implicated in proceedings at both the national and international
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levels were members of Gbagbo's camp” (Corey- Boulet, 2012, p.71) ; “None of Ouattara's outof-control followers, including members of the official armed forces under his control, have been
charged or even credibly investigated” (Corey-Boulet, 2012, p.71) ; “The Court has targeted
some individuals, but neglected others equally well known for their violence and crimes”
(Gegout, 2013, p.807) ; “On the one hand, perpetrators of Rome Statute crimes in the selected
situations are, probably, tried/punished by the ICC, and their victims given justice. On the other
hand, perpetrators of the same crimes in the disregarded situations go free, and their victims are
permanently denied justice where municipal tribunals are unable or unwilling to try the
perpetrators” (Ezennia, 2016, p.477); “The OTP has also concluded preliminary examinations on
the situations in Iraq, Palestine, and Venezuela, respectively. In its reports, however, it concluded
that, although Rome Statute crimes were committed, these three situations were not ‘grave’
enough to merit formal investigations” (Ezennia, 2016, p.453) ; “For most conflict situations, the
OTP has only pursued prosecutions of individuals on one side of the conflict” (Tiemessen, 2013,
Case Selection: Defying Gravity?, para.6) ; “The crimes of ruling elites in these conflict
situations are indeed grave but the OTP contends that crimes are not grave enough relative to
their opponents’ crimes in order to justify indictments” (Tiemessen, 2013, Case selection:
Defying gravity?, para.7) ; “The lack of justice for crimes by both sides to the conflict seriously
compromises perceptions of the ICC’s independence and has undermined its credibility among
affected communities in Uganda” (Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.26) ; “And while the
government has largely been supportive of the ICC’s work, it is also of note that no charges of
abuse have been brought against the DRC military or government officials, leading to questions
about the impartiality of the court” ( Kenney & Norris, 2018, p.32) ; “To date, only charges

67
against Gbagbo and his inner circle have been brought, while none have been brought against his
opponent, Alassane Ouattara, and his supporters” (Kenney & Norris, 2018, p.40).
Category 2: Is Targeting Only Africa
My analysis found that, in the second category, 1 author offered 1 comment. Category 2
(“Is targeting only Africa”) was evidenced by such remarks as, “Syria also offers the strongest
ammunition to critics of the ICC that too much attention has been focused on Africa and not
enough elsewhere” (Kenney & Norris, 2018, p.46).
Category 3: Is Instrumentalized by States
My analysis found that, in the third category, 4 authors offered 4 comments. Category 3
(“Is instrumentalized by States”) was evidenced by such remarks as, “States, while acting
legally, use the ICC for political motives, and this can sometimes work against the principles of
international criminal justice” (Gegout, 2013, p.804) ; “The Ugandan example demonstrates how
a referring party both invited the icc to investigate alleged crimes committed in an ongoing
conflict, therefore employing lawfare, and expected and received preferential treatment and a
one-sided investigation of abuses committed” (Fisher & Stefan, 2016, p.245) ; “African elites
arguably have viewed the ICC, at least partially, as a tool for use in undercutting domestic
political competitors although without much foresight or forethought on how they themselves
might end up in the dock” (Cannon et al., 2016, pp.9-10) ; “Specifically, States Parties have
strategically referred their conflict situations to the ICC with the expectation that the referral will
result in the removal of their rivals and sanction the impunity of ruling elites” (Tiemessen, 2016,
p.409).
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Category 4: Is Instrumentalized by UNSC
My analysis found that, in the fourth category, 6 authors offered 7 comments. Category 4
(“Is instrumentalized by UNSC”) was evidenced by such remarks as, “By operating above
international law or pursuing budget policies that would seem to undermine it, major powers are
setting an example of condescension toward the ICC that other countries choose to follow at
their convenience” (Corey-Boulet, 2012, p.79) ; “It has been noted that the UNSC has been
particularly passive and absent in giving support to the ICC after the referral of a specific
situation” (Aloisi, 2013, p.154) ; “As the analysis above shows, the lack of commitment to ICC
operations following referrals, the heavily politicized language of the UNSC Resolutions 1593
and 1970, and the "power politics" discourses surrounding talks of future referrals of situations
to the ICC, severely compromises the pursuit of international justice”(Aloisi, 2013, p.167) ; “The
Libyan example demonstrates how the UNSC, as a representative of the international
community, can engage in lawfare by referring a situation to the Court, and at the same time both
avoid referring another like situation because of the self-interest of members of the UNSC and
also shielding particular actors from investigation” (Fisher & Stefan, 2016, p.249) ; “Surely, the
referral and deferral powers of the UNSC lead to a politization of the ICC as the undemocratic
nature of veto power dictates justice at the ICC by selecting who and when investigation and
prosecution take place” (Schneider, 2020, p.96) ; “The article also argues that the ICC system is
subject to external political influence and manipulation by the world’s powerful states against
their less powerful counterparts” (Ezennia, 2016, p.450) ; “3 of the 5 permanent members of the
Security Council are not members of the Rome Statute and yet they have the power under the
Rome Statute to refer other states, including non-members, to the ICC as they have done with
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Sudan and Libya. This is clearly problematic. The situation is exacerbated by the fact some
members of the Security Council have used their veto power to prevent serious crimes taking
place in countries such as Syria from being investigated by the ICC” (Mue, 2016, para.10).
Category 5: Is Endangering Peace and Reconciliation
My analysis found that, in the fifth category, 3 authors offered 3 comments. Category 5
(“Is endangering peace and reconciliation”) was evidenced by such remarks as, “The impact of
the involvement of the ICC in Cȏte d’ Ivoire on reconciliation is undermined by the perception
that the court is pursuing partial or one-sided justice”(Malu, 2016, pp.851) ; “Despite these
legitimate intentions and great expectations, there is little evidence of the efficacy of justice as a
means to peace” (Tiemessen, 2016, p.409) ; “One of the most persistent criticisms of the ICC’s
actions in Africa has been that by prosecuting participants in ongoing or recently settled
conflicts, the Court risks prolonging violence or endangering fragile peace processes” (Arieff et
al., 2011, p.28).
Class 3: Neutral
Seventeen (17) authors provided 21 comments that can be considered “Neutral”
regarding the International Criminal Court. Those comments were analyzed and organized for
lexical similarity (Ganeson, 2021). The comments were then examined more closely for semantic
similarity (i.e., actual meaning of the words and the comment) and 3 categories emerged: 1)
Divided opinions among African states, 2) Selectivity of Africa’s support and cooperation, 3) Is
not providing deterrence.
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Category 1: Divided Opinions Among African States
My analysis found that, in the first category, 5 authors offered 6 comments. Category 1
( “Divided opinions among African states”) was evidenced by such remarks as, “Turning back to
the issues surrounding Bashir, even though the AU appeared to take a unanimous stance on the
issuing of an arrest warrant, the summit further revealed deep fissures between African countries,
led on the one side by South Africa, Ghana, and Botswana, and by Libya, Eritrea, Egypt and
other non-party countries on the other” (Mills, 2012, p.436) ; “Pro ICC actors claim that AU
countries have an obligation, per the Rome Statute and the AU Constitutive Act, to uphold the
anti-impunity norm and, on these grounds, justify their reluctance to defer the investigation in
Sudan and to exempt sitting Heads of State and Government from prosecution” (Iommi, 2020,
p.119) ; “Simultaneously, the AU favors an interpretation of articles 27, 15, 16 and 98 that
privileges peace, sovereignty, anti-colonialism and pan-African solidarity over the anti-impunity
norm” (Iommi, 2020, p.119) ; “It has been pointed out that many African States are supportive of
the current work of the ICC, and this is further evidenced by the number of self-referrals made
by African States which evidently see the ICC as having a role to play in solving their problems”
(Magliveras & Naldi, 2013, p.446) ; “Although the AU had authorized the development of a
collective ICC withdrawal strategy from the Rome Statute, a majority of African states attending
the annual Assembly of State Parties (ASP) meeting in New York in November 2016 stated their
intention to remain members of the ICC” (Cannon et al., 2016, p.24) ; “And yet, the decision of
South Africa and Burundi have polarized African states on the issue of the ICC and given
credence of a significant divide between African states. While Namibia and The Gambia have
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said they too would withdraw, far more states have openly expressed support for the ICC”
(Kersten, 2016b, para.4).
Category 2: Selectivity of States’ Support and Cooperation
My analysis found that, in the second category, 8 authors offered 10 comments. Category
2 (“Selectivity of Africa’s support and cooperation”) was evidenced by such remarks as, “The
big question is whether Ouattara's government will cooperate and foster a process of balanced
justice at home so that the courts are seen as even-handed at every level” (Corey-Boulet, 2012,
p.79) ; “While the AU has had and may continue to have arguable points of law concerning the
interpretation of the Rome Statute, its standpoint on withholding its Member States' co-operation
from the ICC has been unreasonable, and has rather demonstrated lèse-majesté for a multilateral
institution established to fight impunity” (Magliveras & Naldi, 2013, p.444) ; “States can hamper
the work of the ICC when they decide not to cooperate with it when it has issued an arrest
warrant” (Gegout, 2013, p.805) ; “In this article we have suggested that cooperation with the ICC
is a function of states’ domestic and international interests” (Hillebrecht & Straus, 2017, p.185) ;
“In general, state incumbents, meaning individual political elites who hold office at the time of
their interactions with the ICC, cooperate most completely when the targets of investigation and
indictment are their political or military opponents” (Hillebrecht & Straus, 2017, p.163) ; “By the
same logic, state incumbents reject the Court’s authority most completely when members of a
ruling coalition are the targets of the ICC” (Hillebrecht & Straus, 2017, p.163) ; “As much as the
Court wishes otherwise, it will never receive full cooperation from states whose officials it
investigates. Its role as a court of law may consequently suffer, as the ICC ultimately relies on
state cooperation to gather evidence and enforce its arrest warrants” (Kersten, 2017, What
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happens now for the ICC? para.11); “But as a general rule of thumb, state support for the ICC
tends to be higher during ongoing conflicts than once war has concluded. During periods of
active political violence, the potential post-conflict politics of a transitional state are unclear.
Once a certain level of clarity on what a post-conflict transitional state will look like is achieved,
support for ICC interventions tends to drop” (Kersten, 2014, It wants to, para.14); “Ultimately,
African support and criticism of international criminal justice is selective” (Kersten, 2015b,
Prosecuting African Heads of State, par.30) ; “Evidence indicates that state parties do not at all
times cooperate with the Court. In fact, at times, some state parties seem to have undermined the
work of the Court” (Malu, 2019, p.9).
Category 3: Is Not Promoting Deterrence
My analysis found that, in the second category, 5 authors offered 5 comments. Category
3 (“Is not promoting deterrence”) was evidenced by such remarks as, “Indeed, rebels are harder
to deter than governments” (Jo & Simmons, 2016, p.470) ; “It is also highly unlikely that the
ICC intervention will end political conflict or represent a solution for electoral fraud”(Hohn,
2014, p.583) ; “Leaders from states that have not ratified the Rome Statute will be unlikely to
expect the ICC to impose costs on them” (Appel, 2018, p.12) ; “Despite the legitimate intention
of pairing justice with conflict resolution, the ICC has had little success in deterring and
removing elite perpetrators of atrocities with its judicial interventions in Uganda, the DRC,
Sudan, Libya, and Côte d’Ivoire given that wanting state cooperation has hampered arrests and
most conflicts are ongoing despite the ICC” (Tiemessen, 2016, p.425) ; “The goal of deterrence
has been particularly salient in the ICC’s investigations in Africa, which have focused on regions
where atrocities are ongoing or have only recently ended. However, difficulties encountered in

73
enforcing ICC arrest warrants and the fact that the Court has yet to convict any suspects have led
some to question whether the threat of ICC prosecution is credible” (Arieff et al., 2011, p.26).
Study Summary
The International Criminal Court is a permanent court created to investigate and
prosecute individuals who commit crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and crime of
aggression. This court like other ad hoc tribunals faces some challenges. Therefore, this study
tries to answer the following research questions:
• What are the challenges faced by the International Criminal Court specifically regarding
Africa?
• Do the challenges outweigh the advantages of this court?
This study is an exploratory study focusing on the goals of the court, the challenges of
administering it, observations of scholars who have studied it and citizens of countries who
benefited or not benefited from it and others who have cared to offer insights. Moreover, the
research method used in this study is a content analysis that explore the assessments made by
scholars (i.e., support, oppose, neutral) of the International Criminal Court and the role of the
court in Africa. Also, content analysis requires coding and categorizing through a data collection
instrument and a filling system. Besides, in this study I analyzed the different materials to
identify textual similarities. This was accomplished by consolidating codified text or words.
The analysis of the different materials revealed three classes and seventeen categories.
Indeed, the first class “Support” had nine categories while the second class “Oppose” had five
categories. The third and final class, “Neutral” had three categories. The findings showed that
eighteen (18) authors in the sample support the court. Indeed, for these authors, the International
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Criminal Court has many benefits such as promoting anti-impunity, promoting deterrence,
promoting domestic prosecutions, providing hope for victims and civilians, promoting respect
for victims’rights, providing accountability, providing international justice and peace. Also, they
qualify the court as a no-biased and anti-racist court.
On the contrary, fifteen (15) authors do not support the court by saying that the court is
not only selective but also is instrumentalized by states and the United Nations Security Council.
In addition to these statements, they assert that the court is targeting only Africa and is
endangering peace and reconciliation. Moreover, seventeen (17) authors adopt a neutral attitude
toward the court. For these authors, despite its weaknesses, the court has some benefits that
cannot be neglected.
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Chapter 5: LIMITATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, and RECOMMENDATIONS
Limitations
One limitation of this study is that it is only focused on the ICC’s involvement in Africa.
Therefore, the challenges I talked about in this study and the assessments made by scholars (i.e.,
support, oppose, neutral) of the International Criminal Court may not necessarily apply in other
countries outside Africa. The second limitation is that I was not able to do surveys or make some
interviews with people. Indeed, I was not able to talk to people directly to get their opinion and
perspectives. I focused on what scholars have written. Therefore, I could miss some details that I
could get if I talk to people directly. Also, I did not have access to people who have a strong
opinion about the International Criminal Court and have not written it. I did not include the
perspectives of those people in our study.
Conclusions of the Study
One of my research questions was to determine if the challenges faced by the
International Criminal Court outweigh its benefits. In this study, I found that 18 authors support
the court, and seventeen authors adopt a neutral attitude toward the court. It is noteworthy that
even though those seventeen authors adopt a neutral attitude toward the court, they said that
despite the court’s weaknesses, this court has some benefits that cannot be neglected. I can
conclude that the challenges faced by the court do not outweigh its benefits.
Recommendations and Implications for future research
In my opinion, the International Criminal Court is the only permanent international
criminal court that has the ability to prosecute those who commit international crimes such as
crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and crime of aggression. This court can end
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impunity for those individuals and ensure justice for victims of the crimes. Indeed, the
International Criminal Court makes a significant contribution to the fight against human rights
violations. This court has allowed international recognition of the primacy of human rights and a
more compelling respect for human rights.
It should also be noted that the International Criminal Court has a considerable positive
impact in Africa. In fact, it brings justice to the victims of crimes punished by the Court in the
situations covered by its investigations. Thanks to its innovative system of victim participation,
some victims have the opportunity to present their points of view and concerns before the Court
and to have reparations for the damages they have had. Also, the Trust Fund for Victims is an
unprecedented mechanism in international justice, which provides assistance to victims of crimes
against humanity and the crime of genocide. This fund launches some projects in Central African
Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Northern Uganda. For example, in 2020, the
fund launched a project in Central African Republic to provide support and assistance to victims
of crimes and their families in Bangui. This program gives access to food security and nutritional
support, to psychological care; to housing for homeless victims; to education for dependents; to
medical care for pathological diseases associated with HIV/Aids, and assistance with incomegenerating activities.
Moreover, through its case law, the court showed that some crimes such as the
destruction of religious and historical buildings as a war crime and gender-based persecution as a
crime against humanity deserve to be punished. Also, the judicial procedures against government
officials, rebels, and jihadists reveal that not only that impunity is not acceptable but also that the
court may have jurisdiction over everybody.
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Established by the Rome Statute, the International Criminal Court has fulfilled, to some
extent, the expectations for which it was created. However, there are still many challenges for the
Court to achieve its full potential. Indeed, despite its contribution to the revalorization of human
rights and the fight against impunity, the court is not perfect. This court faces many challenges
such as its difficult relationship with some Africa states, the influence exercised by states and
some permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and the lack of cooperation
from states parties.
To handle these difficulties, I suggest some solutions to improve this court that deserves
to exist despite the issues it may encounter. These recommendations may improve the
effectiveness and the efficiency of the court. Firstly, there should be a modification in the
process of referrals of situations and cases to the Court. The United Nations Security Council’s
referrals may be replaced by the United Nations General Assembly’s referrals. In that way, the
three influential members of the Security Council, namely Russia, China, and the United States
of America, will not have the final say in shaping the jurisdiction of the Court. All states
members to the international community will have a stand and their opinion and vote will be
adequately addressed. This recommendation requires an amendment to the Rome Statute to
replace the United Nations Security Council’s referrals with the United Nations General
Assembly’s referrals.
Secondly, it is necessary to increase the budget of the Office of the Prosecutor. The
financial, human, and logistical resources of the Office of the Prosecutor should be strengthened
so that it can carry out investigations in all countries. Thus, it will no longer be Africans alone
who will be the subject of proceedings before the Court. Third, all countries especially China,
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Russia, and the United States should ratify the Rome Statute so that the International Criminal
Court can put an end to impunity, guarantee the right to reparation and constitute a real
instrument of prevention and enforcement of laws regarding international crimes.
Fourth, states’ cooperation is required for the fight against impunity. Indeed, States
Parties must incorporate into their domestic legislation the provisions of the Rome Statute and
modify their laws to respond to the court’s requests for assistance. These requests for assistance
may relate to the identification of a person, the place where he is, the location of his property, the
questioning of persons under investigation or prosecution, the execution of searches and seizures,
preservation of evidence, freezing or seizure of proceeds of crime, property, assets and
instrumentalities that are related to international crimes. Fifth, in the absence of consensus, the
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council should abstain from vetoing
resolutions referring cases.
Sixth, African states should establish strong, effective judicial systems that would be able
to still hold criminals accountable, reduce impunity for misconduct, and provide justice for
victims. Seventh, the domestic judicial capacity of states that are unable to investigate or
prosecute crimes themselves should be enhanced. Such a reinforcement of national jurisdiction
requires an assistance from the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor. Indeed, the Office of the
Prosecutor may encourage national proceedings by providing information, working with officials
and experts from the countries in question. Eighthly, the Office of the Prosecutor should seek to
complete more quickly the phases of its preliminary examinations in countries such as Colombia,
Guinea, Nigeria, Ukraine, Republic of the Philippines, Venezuela I, Venezuela II, and Bolivia.
The court should be more transparent and open about developments in preliminary examinations
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taking place outside Africa. Ninth, the court should seek to investigate more cases outside
Africa.
Finally, to improve the relation between Africa and the International Criminal Court,
African states should establish Courts like the Extraordinary African Chambers. The
Extraordinary African Chambers within the Courts of Senegal have been created to prosecute
international crimes committed in Chad between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1990. The
Extraordinary African Chambers (ACE) is a tribunal created in 2013 by an agreement between
the African Union (AU) and Senegal. This tribunal prosecuted and convicted the former Chadian
President Hissene Habre for charges of crimes against humanity, torture, and war crimes. The
trial of Hissene Habre was the first trial in the world in which the courts of one country
prosecuted the former ruler of another for alleged human rights crimes. It was also the first
universal jurisdiction case to proceed to trial in Africa. The Extraordinary African Chambers
have the power to prosecute and try the person or persons most responsible for crimes and
serious violations of international law, customary international law and international conventions
ratified by Chad, committed in the territory of Chad during the period from June 7, 1982 to
December 1, 1990.
Moreover, to improve the relationship between Africa and the International Criminal
Court, the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights should be amended. In June
2014, the Assembly of the AU adopted the Malabo Protocol which created the African Court by
adding an International Criminal Law Section to the already existing jurisdiction of the ACJHR
(General Affairs and Human Rights). The Statute of the African Court vests the court with
criminal jurisdiction over 14 crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, the
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crime of aggression, piracy, terrorism, money laundering, mercenarism, corruption, trafficking in
persons, trafficking in drugs, trafficking in hazardous wastes, illicit exploitation of natural
resources, and the crime of unconstitutional change of government. The Statute has made several
progressive steps such as the inclusion of corporate criminal liability and raising the age of child
soldiers to 18 years, not to mention the inclusion of ten transnational crimes under the
jurisdiction of the ACC. Despite the establishment of an African Court for Justice and Human
Rights, one can doubt the commitment of African States to transparent and equitable justice in
the sense that a clause of this protocol (Article 46A bis) grants immunity to Heads of state during
their mandate and senior officials in office. This clause prevents the investigation of heads of
state and senior state officials who often abuse their position to commit violations of human
rights. The immunity clause undermines the legitimacy of the court and the fight against
impunity. Therefore, it is necessary to amend the protocol to remove this clause of immunity.
As I said above, this study has some limitations. This study can lead to additional
research. Indeed, additional research on this topic may be related to the examination of the role
and challenges of the court outside Africa. Also, additional research may be related to the
effectiveness of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights related to the enforcement of
laws regarding international crimes.
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Filing System Sorted on Recording Sheet Number
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